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Abstract
Why do sudden and massive social, economic, and political changes occur when and where they
do? Are there institutional preconditions that encourage such changes when present and discourage such
changes when absent? I employ a general model which suggests that cascades which induce massive equi-
librium changes are more likely to occur in regimes with centralized coercive power, defined as the ability
to impose more than one type of sanction (economic, legal, political, social, or religious). Centralized au-
thorities are better able to suppress subversive actions when external shocks are small, as citizens have little
incentive to incur numerous types of sanctions. However, citizens are also more likely to lie about their
internal preferences in such regimes (e.g., falsely declare loyalty to an oppressive government), entailing
that large shocks are more likely to trigger a cascade when authority is centralized. The model is applied to
the severity of protests that followed austerity measures taken in developing nations since the 1970s.
I am extremely grateful to Andy Gill, Avner Greif, Kristin Kleinjans, Timur Kuran, Michael Makowsky, and Jonathan Meer for
their extremely helpful insights. Comments received at seminars at Duke’s "Islam and Economic Development" Conference, Cal State
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1 Introduction
Economists, political scientists, and sociologists are well aware that small events may act as a spark which
leads to a significant change in equilibrium outcomes. Granovetter (1978) was amongst the first to argue that
cascades can arise when individuals’ preferences are interconnected - if enough people take some action it
encourages others to do the same, which encourages more to do the same, and so on until a vastly different
equilibrium results. In some cases, small events encourage some individuals to publicly reveal their previ-
ously suppressed, privately held preferences, which leads to information revelation or changes in status, in
turn resulting in starkly different equilibria (Granovetter 1978; Oliver, Marwell, and Teixeira 1985; Kuran
1989, 1991, 1995a, 1995b, 1998; Macy 1991; Bernheim 1994; Yin 1998; Kuran and Sunstein 1999; Kuran
and Sandholm 2008). In other instances, such events act as a signal in the decision process, leading to social
learning phenomena such as herd behavior and informational cascades that encourage individuals to ignore
their private information and follow the actions of others (Banerjee 1992, 1993; Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer,
and Welch 1992, 1998; Lohmann 1994; Callander 2007; Watts and Dodds 2007; Siegel 2009; Ellis and
Fender 2011).1
The theoretical and experimental literature in economics focuses primarily on how the interactions amongst
agents precipitates cascades, but provides little macroeconomic or institutional conditions under which such
behavior is more likely to arise (Anderson and Holt 1997; Banerjee 1992, 1993; Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer,
and Welch 1992, 1998; Çelen and Kariv 2004; Kübler and Weizsäcker 2004, 2005; Goeree et al. 2007; Alevy
et al. 2007).2 The works which do study the institutional conditions under which such behaviors emerge
focus primarily on the role that social or political sanctions play in suppressing private opposition to a regime
(Kuran 1989, 1995a; Lohmann 1994; Rasler 1996; Slater 2009). A common theme of these works is that cas-
cades are more likely to occur in autocratic regimes, since they have greater means of restricting expression
than democracies.
Yet, by merely focusing on the political structures in which such phenomena arise, it is possible to over-
look the general microeconomic settings under which these behaviors are facilitated. This paper aims to
1Oliver (1993) provides an overview of the sociological advances made in this literature in the 1980s and early 1990s. Sushil Bikhchan-
dani, David Hirshleifer, and Ivo Welch have organized a website, http://www.info-cascades.info/, which provides a literature review and
links, as of 2004, to articles on information cascades.
2Ellis and Fender (2011) consider the role that information cascades play in revolutionary regime transition, but they model the two
phenomena separately instead of intergrating the two.
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shed light on these settings, formulating a general model which applies to all types of sanctioning authority
(economic, legal, political, social, or religious). It extends on the works cited above, suggesting that cascades
which induce massive economic, social, or political changes may be one consequence of an institutional
arrangement in which one type of authority has multi-lateral coercive power - that is, the ability to affect
sanctions over numerous dimensions. I formulate a model with three types of agents: a group of citizens and
two different institutional authorities. The latter players can be thought of as religious authorities, political
figures, social icons, or legal authorities. One of the authorities is a "central" authority, with the degree of cen-
tralization being the level of the cost imposed on the other authority for transgressing the central authority’s
dictates.3
Previous works have focused on "central authorities" primarily in a political context, as the most obvious
examples come from the political world. For example, political, economic, and religious power in Iran is
"centralized" in the religious establishment. It is costly for political or economic leaders to openly violate the
dictates of religious authorities, which implicitly gives the religious authorities power over numerous types
of sanctions. The same could be said about the leaders of the Communist Party in China or for the autocratic
Arab dictators (e.g., Mubarak, Kadafi) who faced major protests (for reasons highlighted in this model) in
the "Arab Spring" of 2011. Yet, the same also could be said for the medieval Church, which controlled
numerous aspects of one’s life, especially for members of the Church, before facing major protests during the
Reformation.
The model analyzes the interactions between citizens and the authorities under the situation where the
preferences of the latter are not aligned with those of the former. Citizens derive intrinsic utility from their
own actions and have sanctions imposed on them for diverging from the actions of the two institutional
authorities. These actions could represent any number of phenomena in which the desires of some citizens
diverge from those of institutional authorities, such as speaking or writing freely, having more than one child,
or practicing minority religions. Citizens’ utility is also interdependent with other citizens (Granovetter 1978;
3Throughout this paper, I use the term "centralized" to indicate the degree to which coercive power over sanctions affecting different
aspects of one’s life (e.g., political, religious, social) is concentrated in one authority. This is similar to the structure recently proposed
by Slater (2009), who looks at the role that the separation between political elites and communal/religious elites plays in revolution mo-
bilization. This is a broader definition than ones normally used in the political science and political economy literature, which frequently
focus on federalism, administrative centralization, fiscal centralization, or democratic centralization (for example, see Rondinelli [1981]
or Manor [1999]). Any of these forms of centralization fit into the model espoused in this paper, although my focus is the costs imposed
by authorities, not the institutional structures themselves.
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Oliver, Marwell, and Teixeira 1985; Oliver and Marwell 1988; Marwell, Oliver, and Prahl 1988; Macy 1991;
Kuran 1995; Kim and Bearman 1997; Yin 1998; Callander 2007; Siegel 2009; Ellis and Fender 2011).4
That is, they derive disutility when their actions differ from endogenously determined social norms, which
may arise from the importance individuals place on social identity (Akerlof and Kranton 2000, 2005), social
custom and reputation (Akerlof 1980; Romer 1984; Kuran 1989, 1998; Naylor 1990; Gould 1993; Kuran and
Sunstein 1999), or status and conformity (Fershtman and Weiss 1993; Bernheim 1994; Fershtman, Murphy,
and Weiss 1996; Akerlof 1997; Kuran and Sandholm 2008).
This setup entails that highly-centralized authorities - those with coercive power over more than one type
of sanction - are more insulated from pressures for change when exogenous shocks are small. There is less
incentive for citizens to violate the dictates of highly-centralized authorities, as they incur more than one type
of sanction from doing so. In turn, equilibrium actions remain stable as long as shocks are sufficiently small.
However, this logic also entails that citizens are more likely to choose actions further away from their
intrinsic optimum when authority is centralized. Hence, massive changes in equilibrium actions are more
likely to result in centralized regimes when a sufficiently large shock occurs. When a small portion of society
transgresses the law (or norm, or custom, etc.), a cascade can arise when the actions of these citizens encour-
ages more citizens to transgress the law, which encourages even more to evade the law, and so on. This is not
the case when authority is less centralized, as authorities are more likely to accommodate the actions of the
citizenry, and preferences are therefore less likely to be falsified and cascades are less likely to emerge.
In other words, this is a tipping point model. When shocks are small, centralized authorities are more
insulated from change. However, when shocks are larger than the tipping point, equilibrium changes are larger
in economies with highly-centralized authorities.5 One implication of this hypothesis is that institutional
authorities with centralized, multi-lateral coercive power may seem insulated from upheaval when in fact
they are quite vulnerable. Because of this underlying vulnerability, authorities in such societies often do
anything to suppress large shocks from occurring, such as suppressing and controlling media and harshly
combating dissent. This can explain, for example, the extreme measures taken to suppress the internet in
4This differs from the standard economic framework put forth by Olson (1971) and Tullock (1971), where individuals maximize their
own utility independent of others. This property permits Olson and Tullock to suggest that collective action is difficult to sustain in large
groups, but this observation is contradicted numerous times in the historical record.
5Yin (1998) makes a similar point relating shock level to protest scale, but is more concerned with threshold distribution than the interac-
tion between protesters and authorities.
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Iran and China. Such tactics work well to suppress small shocks. However, this also works to further push
the actions of the citizenry away from their intrinsic preferences, which may cause a larger cascade and thus
unintentionally sow the seeds of the authority’s demise. Although this paper is not meant to be predictive,6
it has significant implications for the fate of future of contemporary centralized regimes (e.g., Libya, Syria,
Zimbabwe, Burma, North Korea) following systemic shocks such as major changes in the price of oil or grain
or a natural disaster.7
This paper relates to the large economic, sociological, and political science literature in revolutions.8
The present paper is not meant to accept or deny the validity of any of these arguments, but instead offers a
complementary hypothesis. I do not account for the organizations or leadership that are often instrumental
to revolutionary activity, but instead provide a mapping from broad institutional structure to massive social,
political, and economic change.
Historical examples of massive and unexpected changes occurring in centralized regimes include the fall
of the Egyptian and Tunisian governments in 2011, the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the Bolshevik Revolution
of 1917, the Taiping Rebellion in China (1850-1864), the fall of Iron Curtain governments, the Protestant
Reformation, and many others.9 In this paper, I employ the insights of the model to analyze the numer-
ous austerity protests which occurred in the developing world since the 1970s. An econometric analysis of
these protests from 1976-1992 suggests that protests were more severe under decentralized authorities if they
followed small shocks (proxied by indices of IMF involvement), but were more severe under centralized
6The model could certainly be employed in a predictive manner similar to Bueno de Mesquita (2009). This would require calibration of
the model’s parameters and is outside the scope of this paper.
7It may also be true that the type of policies taken by centralized governments exacerbate shocks to a greater extent than non-centralized
governments (for a recent example, see Meng, Qian, and Yared [2010]; for more on centralization and distribution of public goods, see
Lockwood [2002], Besley and Coate [2003], and Faguet [2004]). Where this is the case, the implications of the model for centralized
governments are even greater.
8The mechanism underlying revolutionary activity in the present paper is closest to Kuran (1989, 1995a, 1995b), who analyzes the
implications of public revelations of private preferences. For overviews of the social analysis of revolutions, see Tanter and Midlarsky
(1967), Shugart (1989), and Goldstone (1994, 2001).
9For more on the broad effects of the centralization of coercive power throughout world history, see Greif (2005). Iyigun (2009) argues
that there is a positive connection between monotheism and the length and bredth of dynastic power, as monotheistic religions have
general been complementary to centralized government (due to high fixed costs of starting a monotheistic religion). This argument is
quite consistent with the one made in the present paper.
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authorities if they followed large shocks.
2 The Model
2.1 Setup
Consider a two-period game with perfect information. There are M + 2 players (where M is large): M
heterogeneous citizens and two institutional (social, political, economic, legal, or religious) authorities, a
central authority (C) and a non-central authority (N ).10 The institutional authorities choose from a continuous
set of actions which the citizens can publicly accept or reject. The model analyzes situations in which the
preferences of some citizens differ exogenously from those of the authorities, so actions could represent
varying levels of freedom of speech, press, or religion, publicly expressed dissatisfaction with the government
or religious authorities, or public opinion on social issues. The progression of events in each period is as
follows:
1. Citizens choose whether to publicly accept or reject C’s action from the previous period. An equilib-
rium is reached before progressing to step 2.
2. The non-central authority chooses an action.
3. The central authority chooses an action.
In the first period, players reach a steady-state equilibrium. In other words, this is a simplification of an
infinitely-repeated game where only the steady states are analyzed. A shock, described in detail below, occurs
between periods one and two.
Each citizen j derives utility from choosing actions, aj;t 2 f0; 1g (where the subscript t denotes the
period), where the citizen publicly accepts C’s dictates if aj;t = 0 and rejects them if aj;t = 1. Citizens
derive greater utility from rejecting C’s dictates when their own intrinsic "bliss point", bj , is further away
from zero. Each citizen is randomly assigned a bliss point from a normal distribution with mean  and
variance 2.11
10The inclusion of only two authorities allows for tractability. The intuition underlying the main results of the model holds in more realistic
situations including numerous types of authorities.
11The assumption that bliss points are normally distributed plays a crucial role in the analysis. Normality is not a necessary feature,
however. Any type of distribution with two inflection points with provide similar results.
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The citizens’ utilities are interdependent; that is, they derive more utility by choosing actions when other
choose the same actions.12 If the citizens choose to publicly reject the authorities’ dictates, they incur costs
which are a function of the actions of the institutional authorities, aCt 2 R+ and aNt 2 R+. These costs are
increasing in the size of the violation (as in Romer [1984], Iannaccone [1988], Bernheim [1994], Kuran [1987,
1995a], Akerlof [1997], Kuran and Sandholm [2008], Rubin [2011]) and represent the costs (or punishments)
associated with publicly breaking a religious dictate, breaking a law, violating a political norm, and the like,
depending on the type of authority in question.
Citizen j’s preferences are described in each period by the following utility function:
Uj;t = I faj;t = 0g
"
 m1 (aj;t   bj) +m2 1
M   1
P
i6=j
I fai;t = 0g
#
+
I faj;t = 1g
2664  m1 (aj;t   bj) +m2
1
M 1
P
i 6=j
I fai;t = 1g
 m3
 
aj;t   aNt 1
 m4  aj;t   aCt 1
3775
= I faj;t = 0g
"
 m1bj +m2 1
M   1
P
i6=j
I fai;t = 0g
#
+
I faj;t = 1g
2664  m1 (1  bj) +m2
1
M 1
P
i6=j
I fai;t = 1g
 m3
 
1  aNt 1
 m4  1  aCt 1
3775 ; (1)
where m1, m2, m3, and m4 are weighting parameters greater than zero and I fg is an indicator function.
The non-central authority, N , derives utility from choosing actions close to its bliss point, bN 2 R+. It
also faces a cost from choosing actions which differ from the central authority, C. Its preferences can be
described as follows:
UNt =  n1
 
bN   aNt
2     aNt   aCt 12 ; (2)
where n1 is a weighting parameter greater than zero.   0 is the primary exogenous parameter of concern
in the model. It denotes the degree to which the non-central authority incurs a cost from diverging from the
12This "social cost" captures the influence of social norms which may arise from the importance individuals place on social identity, social
custom, reputation, status, or conformity. This specification assumes that individuals derive utility from conforming. Gintis (2003)
suggests that "pro-social" behavior may be biologically determined, as humans improved their biological "fitness" by internalizing
cultural norms. Also see Greif (2009) and Greif and Tadelis (2010).
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action of the central authority.13 Although there are certainly endogenous elements to  in reality - for exam-
ple, the degree to which one authority incurs costs from diverging from the other could be a function of the
degree to which the citizens abide by its dictates - endogenizing this key variable unnecessarily complicates
the model. This paper concentrates on massive equilibrium changes over a short period and how such changes
arise rapidly. Broader institutional changes which endogenously effect the level of centralization follow in
the long run due to the interactions described in the model, but should not be affected in the short run by the
rapid, massive change which is at the heart of this model.14
The centralization parameter enters N ’s utility as a scalar which affects the cost N incurs for choosing
an action different from C. At  = 0, there is no such cost, at  !1, there is an infinite cost (if aNt 6= aCt ),
and at  2 (0;1), there is a positive cost that is increasing in . While it is possible (in reality, but not in the
model) that C may also face costs from not conforming to N , the assumption of unidirectional centralization
of coercive power allows for tractability.15 It follows from this setup that at  ! 1, the two authorities are
ostensibly the same actor: power over numerous dimensions is centralized in one authority (C). At large ,
C has significant but not unlimited power over varying types of sanctions.
The central authority, C, derives utility from choosing actions close to its bliss point, bC 2 R+. It
also wishes to minimize the average number of citizens who reject its dictates in the next period. Unlike the
citizens or non-central authority,C is forward-looking. This specification is chosen to highlight the possibility
that central authorities take into account the fact that their unpopular dictates can cause destabilization which
they would prefer to avoid. C’s preferences can be described as follows:
UCt =  c1
 
aCt   bC
2   1
M
P
I fai;t+1 = 1g ; (3)
where c1 is a weighting parameter greater than zero.
Finally, a shock occurs between periods 1 and 2. The shock is formally defined as:16
13For more on the centralization of coercive power, see Greif (2005) and Karaman (2009).
14Moreover, Rubin (2011) shows in a similar model that under a basic set of circumstances, endogenizing the degree of centralization
merely exacerbates the effects seen under an exogenous parameterization, as the feedback between players is more enhanced.
15In fact, the model can be interpreted as one of relative centralization, where  is the cost incurred by N for not following C’s actions
relative to the reverse situation (where C incurs costs). All that is needed for the results to hold is for N to have a greater cost than C.
16This definition of shock is overly strict in order to allow for a more straight-forward analysis. For example, similar qualitative results
emerge if the shock affects citizens differently.
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Definition 1 A shock occurs between periods 1 and 2, where a portion  2 (0; 1) of the citizenry has their
bliss points multiplied by  > 1.
C expects a shock of size  2 R affecting  portion of the citizenry to happen in the next period with
probability  , for all values of  and . I assume without loss of generality that the relationship between
the bliss points is such that 0  bC < bN < . This entails that the shock encourages some of the citizens to
transgress the authorities’ actions (instead of the less interesting case in which shocks encourage citizens to
choose actions closer to those of the authorities).
2.2 Solving the Model
2.2.1 Steady-state in Period 1
I assume steady-state conditions in period 1. That is, time subscripts do not matter; actions in period t   1
are the same as actions in periods t and t+ 1. This specification is chosen to highlight the effect that a shock
has on an economy already in a steady-state (rather than one that is changing anyway). I denote equilibrium
actions with a superscript * and employ the Nash equilibrium concept. I drop the time subscripts in this
section.
I first solve for the optimal actions of N and the citizenry given the action of C. Solving for N is
straight-forward; the first-order condition provides the result:
aN =
n1b
N + aC
n1 + 
: (4)
A little algebra indicates that citizen j chooses to publicly accept C’s dictates (aj = 0) when:
bj  1
2m1
"
m1  m2
 
1  2
M   1
P
i6=j
I fai = 0g
!
+m3
 
1  aN+m4  1  aC# (5)
As noted above, the citizens reach an equilibrium in the first stage of each period before N and C act.
In equilibrium, some citizen has the largest bliss point, denoted b, of all of the citizens choosing aj = 0.
If an interior solution exists and there are enough citizens so that the law of large numbers is realized, then
(denoting F () as the normal cdf with mean  and standard deviation 2):
b =
m2
m1
F (b) +
1
2m1

m1  m2 +m3
 
1  aN+m4  1  aC (6)
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Plugging in (4) to (6) entails that b is implicitly defined by:
b =
m2
m1
F (b) +
1
2m1
"
m1  m2 +m3
n1
 
1  bN
n1 + 
+

m3

n1 + 
+m4
 
1  aC# (7)
Since the distribution of bliss points is normally distributed, it is possible for there to be more than one
solution to (7). This can be seen in Figure 1, which (in a manner similar to Granovetter [1978] and Kuran
[1995]) maps b on the horizontal axis and the right-hand side of (7) on the vertical axis, at b rather than b.
A solution to (7) exists where the curve crosses the 45-degree line. These solutions are the maximum bliss
point which chooses aj = 0 in equilibrium.
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]
Figure 1 shows that 3 equilibria can exist: E1, E2, and E3. E3 is a "good" equilibrium from the central
authority’s perspective, since more citizens choose aj = 0, while E1 is a "bad" equilibrium. Moreover, E1
and E3 are stable (or, in game theoretic terms, trembling hand perfect), while E2 is not. To see this, note that
any point at which the curve is above the 45-degree line, such as bliss point Y in Figure 2, is one in which
LHS<RHS of (7). Inequality (5) indicates that for citizens with bliss point between Y and b3, the optimal
action is aj = 0. Hence, the citizen with bliss point Y cannot have the largest bliss point of all citizens
choosing aj = 0 in equilibrium; if it chooses aj = 0, citizens with bliss points between Y and b3 also have
incentive to choose aj = 0. This means that at equilibrium E3, if a small amount of citizens deviate and
choose aj = 1 (say citizens with bliss points between Y and b3), the equilibrium will converge back to E3.
Conversely, this means that at equilibrium E2, if even one citizen deviate and chooses aj = 0, the equilibrium
will move to E3.
At any point in which the curve is below the 45-degree line, such as bliss point X in Figure 2, LHS>RHS
of (7). Inequality (5) indicates that at any bliss point between b1 and X, the optimal action is aj = 1. A
similar logic to that espoused above indicates that if some citizens deviate from E1 to choose aj = 0 (say
citizens with bliss points between b1 and X), the equilibrium will converge back to E1. Conversely, this
means that at equilibrium E2, if even one citizen deviates and chooses aj = 1, the equilibrium will move to
E1.
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE]
This logic entails that equilibria E1 and E3 are stable - if a small group of citizens deviate, they old
equilibrium will quickly re-emerge. On the other hand, it only takes one citizen deviating from E2 for a new
9
equilibrium to emerge. But just how stable are these equilibria, and under what conditions will a cascade
emerge? It can be seen in Figure 2 that, at equilibrium E3, if all of the citizens (plus one) with bliss points
between b2 and b3 change their actions from public acceptance (aj = 0) to public rejection (aj = 1) of the
central authority, E1 will emerge as the equilibrium outcome. All of the citizens with bliss points between
b1 and b2 join the cascade to the new equilibrium. In other words, b2 is the threshold bliss point - if citizens
below bliss point b2 choose aj = 1, E1 will emerge, while E3 will emerge if citizens above b2 choose aj = 0.
For the remainder of the analysis, assume that the period 1 equilibrium is the one with the least public
dissent (E3), if E3 exists. After all, the interesting case is one in which a shock encourages an acquiescing
citizenry to publicly dissent. It follows from the above logic that a cascade of public dissent will happen over
a larger set of shocks if b2 and b3 are close to each other. In other words, when the threshold citizen (the one
with bliss point b2) has a similar bliss point to the citizen with the highest bliss point who publicly accepts,
a small number of citizens need to change actions in order for the cascade threshold to be passed. The shape
and position of the curve thus determine how likely it is that a cascade will arise. This shape and position of
the curve, in turn, are determined by the parameter values (especially the centralization parameter, ) and the
decision of the central authority.
2.2.2 Cascades and Centralization
Note from (7) that changes in the centralization parameter () or the central authority’s action (aC) merely
shift the curve in Figures 1 and 2. For the moment, assume that the central authority chooses aC = 0,
thus maximizing the probability of a "good" equilibrium emerging. The curve shifts up monotonically as 
increases. It is instructive to analyze the curve at the endpoints of  (0 and1). We can re-write (7) at  = 0
and aC = 0 as:
b =
m2
m1
F (b) +
1
2m1
 
m1  m2 +m3
 
1  bN+m4 (8)
and we can re-write (7) at  !1 and aC = 0 as:
b =
m2
m1
F (b) +
1
2m1
(m1  m2 +m3 +m4) (9)
I assume that an interior solution exists.17 Since the curve is merely a shifted cdf of a normal distribution,
17In other words, bmin < 12m1
 
m1  m2 +m3
 
1  bN+m4 and bmax > 12m1 (m1 +m2 +m3 +m4), where bmin and
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the inflection point is , the mean bliss point. This can be seen in Figure 3.
[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE]
The second feature of concern is how steep the curve is around the mean. A steep curve is one with a
small standard deviation; this means that most of the realizations of the distribution are found near the mean.
This also means that the bottom of the curve is more likely to jut out and cross the 45-degree line. A flatter
curve is one with a larger standard deviation; it is flatter because there are more realizations at the tails. Figure
4 displays this graphically. It shows two curves with all of the same parameters (including ) but different
values of . It indicates that smaller values of  entail steeper curves. It is straight-forward to see that the
slope of the curve at the inflection point approaches infinity as  ! 0.
[INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE]
I start the analysis by characterizing two trivial equilibria. First, when the bliss points of the citizens
are sufficiently close to the action of C (that is, when  is sufficiently small), few citizens publicly reject C
(choose aj = 1), and the economy is always in a "good" equilibrium from the perspective of C. In this case,
a cascade cannot emerge because even when a shock convinces some citizens to publicly reject C, there is
not broad enough support amongst the citizens for a mass rejection of C. In terms of the model, the curve
will only cross the 45-degree line once, at the "good" equilibrium, regardless of the value of the centralization
parameter . This is seen in Figure 5.
[INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE]
Second, if the citizens have bliss points that are sufficiently different from the action ofC ( is sufficiently
large), most citizens will publicly reject C regardless of the other parameters, and the economy is always in
a "bad" equilibrium from the perspective of C. In this case, it is trivial to note that a cascade of public
dissent cannot emerge; most citizens dissent prior to the shock occurring. In terms of the model, the curve
only crosses the 45-degree line once, at the "bad" equilibrium, regardless of the value of the centralization
parameter . This is seen in Figure 6.
[INSERT FIGURE 6 HERE]
bmax are the minimum and maximum realizations of b, respectively.
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This above logic is formalized in Proposition 1. The proofs for all propositions are found in Appendix D.
Proposition 1 If   12m1

m1  m2 +m3
 
1  bN+m4, then cascades never occur and the economy is
at the "good" equilibrium. If  > 12m1 [m1 +m2 +m3 +m4], then cascades never occur and the economy
is at the "bad" equilibrium.
These two parts of the equilibrium space are the least interesting ones, as cascades do not emerge in
either. Before moving on, however, note that both cases are less likely to arise when citizens place significant
weight on acting like others (m2). This is not a surprising result; after all, cascades are unlikely to arise
when people care little about what others are doing. When preferences are not interdependent (or are weakly
interdependent), the mechanism underlying cascades is absent.
For the rest of the paper, consider the more interesting case where the mean bliss point of the citizens is
in between the two cases highlighted in Proposition 1. At the lower end of this range, the mean bliss point of
the citizens is relatively close to the action of the central authority. Hence, in some cases too many citizens
"agree" with the central authority for a cascade of dissent to emerge, and the equilibrium is a good one from
the perspective of C. When cascades do emerge, they are less likely to do so in highly centralized economies
(high ). This is because the combination of much of the citizenry "agreeing" with C combined with addi-
tional sanctions (from N ) for publicly rejecting C reduce the incentive for the threshold citizens to join in
voicing their opinion (and choosing aj = 1). Meanwhile, the reduced sanctions in decentralized economies
(low ) encourage the threshold citizens to join others and a cascade arises. This logic is summarized in
Proposition 2.18
Proposition 2 If  2 12m1
 
m1  m2 +m3
 
1  bN+m4;m1 +m3  1  bN+m4, then 9  and ,
where  < , such that:
i) No cascade ever emerges and the economy is in a "good" equilibrium if   
ii) Cascades can only emerge at    (for some value ) and all economies with  >  are in a
"good" equilibrium if  2 [; )
18I assume in this Proposition thatm2 > m3bN . This simply entails that the citizens place a sufficiently large weight on social pressures.
This assumption is only necessary for a small part of the equilibrium to hold (at small ). Since I do not focus on this part of the
equilibrium solution in the analysis, I do not spend time discussing this assumption. The equilibrium is straight-forward to characterize,
though it is a bit more complicated, if m2  m3bN .
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iii) Cascades can emerge for all  if  < 
Part i) of Proposition 2 is represented in Figure 5, ii) is represented in Figure 7, and iii) is represented
in Figure 8. The type of equilibrium that emerges is dependent on the mean and standard deviation of the
citizens’ bliss points. When the citizens’ bliss points are close to the actions of C ( is small, as it is in
this case), cascades are unlikely to occur under highly centralized rule. Citizens are relatively happy, since
they choose actions close to their bliss points, and publicly rejecting C is costly. Cascades are more likely
to occur, however, as  decreases. This is because citizens are clustered together more closely (at the mean)
when  is small, and so a shock which encourages some near the mean to publicly reject C (aj = 1) is more
easily transmitted to other like-minded citizens.
[INSERT FIGURES 7 AND 8 HERE]
The much more interesting case is when most citizens "disagree" with C ( is large).19 This is often true
in autocratic regimes, where the interests of the autocrat and the citizens are not always aligned. Indeed, it
is in these situations where revolutions occur; when a cascade occurs in a regime where the citizens disagree
with the central authority, the change in expressed preferences is much greater than in a regime where most
citizens agree with the central authority.
In this case, centralized authorities are better able to suppress dissent and are more insulated from small
shocks. Decentralized authorities are less able to suppress dissent, because they are less able to impose mul-
tiple sanctions. Yet, because centralized authorities are able to impose multiple sanctions on dissent, citizens
are less likely to publicly reject C despite disagreeing with its dictate. This enables a situation where citizens
"falsify their preferences" to a greater degree in centralized regimes. That is, citizens under centralized rule
are more likely to disagree with C but not publicly reject C. Kuran (1995a, p. 3) defines preference falsifi-
cation as "the act of misrepresenting one’s genuine wants under perceived social pressures." When citizens
falsify their preferences, they choose actions which differ from their bliss point for two reasons. First, per-
ceived social pressures encourage them to choose actions similar to those chosen by others. Secondly, this
outcome is exacerbated when institutional sanctions are severe (m3 and m4 are large) and the actions of the
authorities diverge from the bliss point of the citizenry.
19The case when  2 1
2m1
 
m1 +m3
 
1  bN+m4;m1 +m3 +m4 is omitted for brevity. The full characterization of this
equilibrium is available in the Appendix.
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The major upshot of increased preference falsification is that cascades are more likely to occur after a
large shock in centralized regimes than they are in decentralized regimes. After a large shock, a cascade is
more likely to occur where citizens are falsifying their preferences; once some citizens act closer to their
internal preferences by publicly rejecting C (choosing aj = 1), others will find it more attractive to publicly
rejectC, especially since they disagreed withC in the first place. This is less likely to happen in decentralized
regimes, where citizens are more likely to publicly reject C prior to the shock. This logic is summarized in
Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 If  2 12m1 (m1 +m3 +m4;m1 +m2 +m3 +m4], then 9  and , where  < 
such that:
i) No cascade ever emerges and the economy is in a "bad" equilibrium if   
ii) Cascades can only emerge at    (for some value ) and all economies with  <  are in a
"bad" equilibrium if  2 ; .
iii) Cascades can emerge for all  if  < .
In cases ii) and iii), as  increases, C is more insulated from small shocks but is more susceptible to large
equilibrium changes (relative to the pre-shock state) after large shocks.
Part i) of Proposition 3 is represented in Figure 6, part ii) is represented in Figure 9, and part iii) is
represented in Figure 8. As in Proposition 2, the type of equilibrium that emerges is dependent on the mean
and standard deviation of the citizens’ bliss points. When the citizens’ bliss points are far away from the
actions of C ( is large, as it is in this case), cascades are more likely to occur under highly centralized
rule following large shocks. Although highly centralized authorities are more insulated from small shocks,
citizens are relatively unhappy. This means that when a shock is large enough that some citizens publicly
reject C, the cost to publicly rejecting C decreases, encouraging more citizens to publicly reject C, and so
on. Relative to the pre-shock state - which may often seem tranquil - centralized regimes are subject to
massive changes in public opinion despite having the appearance of public acceptance.
[INSERT FIGURE 9 HERE]
Finally, consider the action of the central authority. The analysis thus far has assumed that C chooses
the most oppressive action (aC = 0) to maximize the probability of a "good" equilibrium emerging. (7)
indicates that less oppressive actions (increases in aC) shift the curve downward, making cascades towards
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bad equilibria more likely to occur. Yet, (3) indicates that aC = 0 may not be C’s optimal action. C may be
willing to forgo some probability of a cascade emerging (especially if the cascade is not that large) in order
to choose an action closer to its bliss point bC . Yet, as long as C’s bliss point (bC) and the weight that C
places on its bliss point (c1) are not sufficiently large, the intuition and the results of the propositions do not
change. C may be willing to forgo some probability of a cascade in order to choose an action closer to its bliss
point, but centralized authorities are still more subject to cascades following large shocks than decentralized
authorities when the citizens "disagree" with C ( is large).
2.3 Discussion
The intuition formalized in Proposition 3 offers two explanations for why seemingly tranquil, centralized
societies can quickly undergo massive changes, especially when the centralized authority promotes policies
that are detrimental to most citizens (that is,  differs substantially from aC). One explanation, which is also
offered by Granovetter (1978) and Kuran (1989, 1995a, 1995b), is that preference falsification can encourage
latent movements in social norms to emerge after a shock. That is, an economic, political, or social shock
may move equilibrium actions by enough to encourage most citizens, even those who are not directly affected
by the shock, to choose drastically different actions.
The other explanation, which is novel to this paper, sheds light on the role that institutional structures
play in determining the effects of shocks. It suggests that a high degree of centralization of coercive power
discourages marginal changes to equilibrium actions after small shocks. Citizens have less incentive to pub-
licly dissent, as they incur two institutional costs from doing so. The same citizens may be more encouraged
to publicly dissent in less centralized societies, however, as they face less cost from doing so and the author-
ities (especially the non-central authority) react by changing their actions to a greater extent. On the other
hand, when larger shocks materialize, cascades towards vastly different equilibria are more likely to result
in highly centralized economies. This occurs because citizens falsify their preferences to a greater extent in
such economies, and thus large shocks encourage some citizens to change their actions, in turn making it
more likely that the institutional laws will be much different in the post-shock equilibrium.
Kuran (1995a, 1995b) and Yin (1998) do suggest that unanticipated regime change is more likely to occur
in politically repressive countries. Their hypotheses coincide with the one made in the present paper, though
it is not clear that their hypotheses hold when other types of freedoms (religious, economic, legal) exist in
politically repressive regimes. The essential difference between the present hypothesis and Kuran’s and Yin’s
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is that I stress the interdependence of institutions that are able to impose different types of sanctions. This
leads to a similar conclusion as Kuran and Yin, as such institutional structures are often found in politically
repressive regimes.
The model also sheds light on the connection between institutional centralization and revolutions. Numer-
ous definitions for revolution exist in scholarly works.20 For example, Goldstone (2001) defines revolution
as "an effort to transform the political institutions and the justifications for political authority in a society, ac-
companied by formal or informal mass mobilization and non-institutionalized actions that undermine existing
authorities." Kuran (1989, 1995a) broadly defines a revolution as a discontinuous change in public opinion or
social order and Davies (1962) defines revolutions as "violent civil disturbances that cause the displacement
of one ruling group by another that has a broader popular basis for support."
The model suggests that revolutions may occur in centralized regimes after a shock only when the shock is
sufficiently large; on the other hand, smaller shocks are more easily repressed in centralized regimes. "Shock"
is a somewhat ambiguous term, but the literature on revolutions provides numerous types of shocks that could
precipitate revolutions, such as sharp reversals in economic fortunes (Davies 1962; Tanter and Midlarsky
1967), rapid economic growth (Olson 1963), defeat in war, or sustained population growth (Goldstone 2001).
Moreover, consider the implications of the model for centralized regimes. Holding the degree of cen-
tralization () constant, which parameters affect the likelihood of revolution in such regimes? Proposition 3
suggests that shocks are more likely to lead to massive changes in centralized economies when the shock is
sufficiently large in scope. Thus, a straight-forward way for centralized authorities to prevent revolutions is
to decrease the number of citizens directly affected by a shock, which in turn decreases the probability of a
cascade emerging. This often takes the form of the authority attempting to do everything possible to ensure
that if a shock occurs, it is spread to as small of a portion of the population as possible. This provides a reason
why centralized, authoritarian governments often impose restrictions on domestic and international media,
the Internet, and social networking. Public dissatisfaction expressed in protests or other types of grievances
is more likely to result in a cascade of public dissent the more that people know that others are willing to
act in a way that coincides with their own intrinsic beliefs. Hence, media suppression is more likely to exist
in economies where coercive power is centralized, since anti-government shifts of public opinion are more
likely to form as a result of a systemic shock in such economies.
20There is a large literature merely attempting to define the term revolution. I have no desire to enter this debate, summarized nicely by
Goldstone (2001), and instead note that revolutions are an extreme form of massive equilibrium change.
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In sum, the following testable predictions arise from this framework:
 When the preferences of central authorities are not aligned with those of the citizens:
– Centralized authorities are more insulated from small shocks; that is, little public dissent is likely
to occur following small shocks in centralized regimes
– Centralized authorities are more susceptible to large changes in public dissent after large shocks;
that is, cascades of dissent are more likely to arise following larger shocks in centralized regimes
 When the preferences of central authorities are close to being aligned with those of the citizens:
– Centralized authorities are more insulated from small and large shocks; that is, cascades of public
dissent are less likely to occur under centralized rule
3 Austerity Riots and Centralization
A primary implication of the model is that countries with centralized authorities are more insulated from
change when economic shocks are small but are more susceptible to sudden, massive changes when economic
shocks are large. In this section, I test the hypothesis by analyzing the severity of austerity protests in the
developing world between 1976 and 1992. Such protests were common in the developing world beginning
in the mid-1970s in reaction to measures employed - almost always as a condition of IMF aid - to combat
inflation and government debt. I test the relationship between a series of "IMF pressure" variables and
severity of protests over differing degrees of institutional centralization to shed light on the relationships
espoused in the model. Although the data cannot speak to the microeconomic mechanisms highlighted in
the model (namely, those related to internal and expressed preferences and cascades), it can shed light on
the connections between macroeconomic events, institutional structures, and changes in publicly expressed
opinions. This analysis underscores the determinants of protest severity (a macro concept) as well as sudden
equilibrium changes (a micro concept), since the latter is realized in the former.
Modern austerity protests began in the mid-1970s, with the first one occurring in Peru in 1976. The
protests were sparked by austerity measures which were almost always imposed by the IMF as a condition of
assistance. The stated aims of these measures were freeing up markets and cutting government spending in
order to reduce government debt and curb massive inflation. These market-based measures, known by some
as “shock treatment”, included currency devaluation, broad reduction of spending on the public sector, priva-
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tization of state-owned corporations, cuts in public subsidies for food and basic necessities, wage restraints,
higher interest rates, and elimination of protectionism (Walton and Seddon 1994).21
These policies sparked protests in many places where they were imposed. Such protests were defined
by Walton and Seddon (1994) as “large scale collective actions including political demonstrations, general
strikes, and riots, which are animated by grievances over state policies of economic liberalization imple-
mented in response to the debt crisis and market reforms urged by international agencies.” The international
agency most associated with these protests is the IMF, and hence Joseph Stiglitz called them “IMF riots”.
The distributional implications of these policies are clear – most policies negatively affected the urban
poor, at least in the short run (Walton and Ragin 1990; Walton and Seddon 1994). The protests were primarily
urban in nature, often following a rise in a price for a specific good or an elimination of a subsidy. In some
cases, the protests were relegated to one city and remained non-violent, such as organized strikes planned in
Ecuador and Bolivia (Walton and Ragin 1990). On the other extreme, protests turned into deadly riots which
spread throughout the country, as was the case of the Venezuelan protest of 1989, where a week of rioting
spread from Caracas to 16 other cities.
What determines the differences in severity of these protests? This topic has received some attention from
sociologists and political scientists, who have proposed a wide range of explanations. Walton and Seddon
(1994) and Walton and Ragin (1990) provide evidence that over-urbanization plays a key role in both the
presence and severity of the riots. They suggest that the linkage between the two lies in the development of
organizational infrastructure capable of mobilizing political action. Walton and Ragin (1990) also suggest
that IMF pressure significantly affects protest severity but inflation and debt do not.22
In this section, I analyze how changes in IMF involvement affected the likelihood of severe protest in a
country. When IMF pressure is present, pressures to liberalize markets generally ensue - and protests may
follow. Proposition 3 of the model suggests that, since austerity measures are actions the differ substantially
from the bliss point of most citizens ( is much different that aC), when IMF pressure (the "shock" in
the model) is small, centralized economies will better be able to suppress protests. However, significant IMF
pressure is more likely to precipitate massive changes in centralized economies. In other words, the following
prediction arises from the model:
21For a scathing review of these policies in the developing world over the last half-century, see Klein (2007).
22On the other hand, Auvinen (1997) finds that poor economic performance (indicated by high inflation and large debt service) is associated
with political demonstrations, riots, and strikes.
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Prediction 1: When there is a small amount of IMF pressure, austerity protests will on average be less
severe in countries with more centralized institutions, all else being equal. However, when there is a large
amount of IMF pressure, austerity protests will on average be more severe in countries with more centralized
institutions.
3.1 Data
Data were gathered on austerity protests covering the same years as Walton and Seddon (1994): 1976-1992.
The former date denotes the onset of the first modern austerity protest while the latter represents the time in
which Walton and Seddon went to press.
As noted by Walton and Ragin (1990), obtaining a complete list of debtor countries that experienced
international pressure to implement austerity measures can only be done indirectly, as the exact terms nego-
tiated between the IMF and debtor countries is kept secret. To this end, I employ three measures identified
by Walton and Ragin as indicative of IMF pressure: 1) the country employed the "extended fund facility"
(EFF), generally reserved for countries suffering a significant imbalance of payments relating to structural
maladjustments in production and trade (IMF [various]), in a given year between 1976 and 1992;23 2) the
country’s ratio of IMF funds used to its IMF quota exceeded 125% in a given year between 1976 and 1992;
3) the country rescheduled or renegotiated its debt in a given year between 1976 and 1992.24 70 countries
satisfied one of these three criteria between 1976 and 1992.25 I form a panel that is restricted to years in
which one of these criteria were satisfied in the country in question within one year (either before or after).
23The IMF defines the extended fund facility as "an IMF lending facility established in 1974 to assist member countries in overcoming
balance of payments problems that stem largely from structural problems and require a longer period of adjustment than is possible under
a Stand-By Arrangement. A member requesting an Extended Arrangement outlines its objectives and policies for the whole period of
the arrangement (typically three years) and presents a detailed statement each year of the policies and measures it plans to pursue over
the next 12 months." (IMF)
24Walton and Ragin split the last category into two: debt rescheduling and debt renegotiation. My reading of the data suggests that the
line between these two is often blurred, so I have lumped them together. Data for EFF and IMF quota comes from various IMF Annual
Reports; data for IMF funds used comes from the World Development Indicators database; data for debt rescheduling and restructuring
comes from clubdeparis.org, Kuhn and Guzmàn (1990), and Dillon et al. (1985).
25Some countries were omitted from the dataset due to lack of IMF or control data. These include:Angola, Barbados, Burma, Dominica,
Equatorial Guinea, Grenada, Liberia, Somalia, Uganda, Western Samoa, Yemen, and Yugoslavia. Iran and South Korea did not satisfy
any of these conditions but are included in the data since there was an austerity protest in each country.
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A list of these countries and the years employed in the data is available in Table A1.
40 countries in the data experienced austerity protests between 1976 and 1992. A Lexis-Nexis search of
news reports of the 70 countries listed in Table A1 (as well as any listed in Walton and Seddon [1994] that
were not in Table A1) from 1976-1992 produced 116 separate instances of austerity protest. Protests and
riots were only documented if they resulted from austerity measures or IMF pressure - other types of anti-
government protests or strikes are not included in the data. Planned general strikes and small, non-violent,
sector-specific strikes are also not included in the data (even if they resulted from austerity measures).26
I subjectively coded each of these protests by severity using the following criterion, which are discussed
further in Appendix B. This appendix also gives a brief description of each protest. An instance was scored
1 if it were a small (relative to population), confined (to one or two cities) protest. General strikes are
not included in the data employed in the regressions analyzed in this section, but I include 86 instances of
general strikes (or small, localized protests) as protests of level 1 in a robustness check in the Appendix C.
General strikes are not included because the model is intended to analyze changes in individual behavior
(on a collective scale) resulting from shocks, not organized, institutionally-driven protests. An instance was
scored 2 if it were either prolonged but confined or widespread but not prolonged and 3 if the protest were
prolonged and contained widespread riots. Only protests with both of these characteristics were coded level
3. An example of a protest coded 3 occurred in Algeria in October 1988, when 159 protesters were killed in a
few major Algerian cities over the span of week and thousands were injured and arrested. The government’s
response to the protests, including those which lead to deaths, were not taken to account when creating the
severity measures. Where government action occurred, the index takes into account the reported events that
the government was responding to, not the government response itself. The reason for this is that it is possible
that centralized governments are more likely to respond with violence. Hence, including the government’s
response would bias the severity index in favor of the proposed hypothesis.
While coding these protests is an admittedly subjective process, a reading of the articles reporting on the
protests generally showed that most protests/riots easily fit into one of these three categories. The differences
between protests coded 1 and other protests are especially stark. The difference between protests coded 2
and 3 are less obvious and thus more subjective, but this is not an issue in the analysis, since protests of these
two severity levels are always lumped together. I also create an alternative index, found in Appendix B, for
26All results are robust to inclusion of general strikes and industry-specific protests as severity 1 protests. These results are available in
Appendix C.
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protests in which the severity level was not obvious. Tables 1 and 2 show the summary statistics of these
protests broken down by year and continent.
[TABLES 1 and 2 HERE]
The intuition outlined in the model indicates that a good proxy for institutional centralization is one that
accounts for one authority’s ability to affect numerous types of sanctions. One such variable is spelled out in
the Polity IV data set (Marshall and Jaggers 2008): constraint on the executive. This variable is defined as:
The extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of chief executives,
whether individuals or collectivities. Such limitations may be imposed by any "accountability
groups." In Western democracies these are usually legislatures. Other kinds of accountability
groups are the ruling party in a one-party state; councils of nobles or powerful advisors in monar-
chies; the military in coup-prone polities; and in many states a strong, independent judiciary.
This variable ranges from 1 to 7, with 1 equaling “Unlimited Authority” (no regular limitations on the
executive’s actions) and 7 equaling “Executive Parity or Subordination” (accountability groups have effective
authority equal to or greater than the executive in most areas of activity). This variable provides an ideal proxy
for the degree of institutional centralization, as spelled out in the model, because it measures the degree to
which political authorities can extend multifarious sanctions.
A weaker proxy of centralization is the Freedom House (2009) "degree of political freedom" variable.
This variable ranges from 1 to 7, with 1 equaling "most free" and 7 equaling "least free". This is hardly
an ideal measure of centralization, as defined in the model, since it does not directly underscore the ability
of the central authority to impose numerous sanctions. However, centralized authorities generally also have
the ability to restrict political freedoms. Nowhere do I claim that centralization has to be the driving force
behind political freedom; I merely suggest that this is one way in which centralization manifests itself. For
these reasons, regressions using this variable should be regarded as robustness checks relative to the results
employing constraint on the executive data.
Other controls are employed to account for phenomena which political scientists, economists, and soci-
ologists consider as salient factors associated with protest activity. These include the urbanization rate, per
capita GDP, population, and a measure of religious fractionalization.27 The religious fractionalization index
27Data on urbanization, GDP, and population comes from World Bank (various). The measure of religious fractionalization is derived
from data found in Barrett, Kurian, and Johnson (2001).
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is constructed like a Herfindahl index, equaling the sum of the proportion of each religion in the country
squared. The summary statistics of all controls are reported in Table 3.
[TABLE 3 HERE]
3.2 Analysis
3.2.1 Testing for the Presence of Protest
The data provide a chance to test the model’s primary prediction: countries with centralized political au-
thorities should have smaller changes (relative to countries with decentralized authority) in expressed public
opinion (as seen in protests) when shocks are small, but larger changes when shocks are large. Yet, before we
can test how shocks (proxied with IMF variables) affect the severity of protests, we must establish whether
the proxies are predictors of protest. In particular, the model suggests testing the following equation, where
Protestit is a dummy equaling 1 if there is a protest in a given year and country, i is the country, t is the year,
X is the set of control variables, and "CP" denotes the "centralization proxy", where both the "constraint
on the executive" and "political freedom" variables are transformed so that higher values indicate greater
centralization.28
Protestit = 0 + 1Shockit + 2CPit + Xit + "it (10)
There are 3 different IMF variables that proxy for a shock: use of IMF funds (divided by IMF quota),
use of EFF funds (divided by IMF quota), and the number of restructurings and reschedulings. The first two
variables are deflated by the country’s IMF quota, which is based on its standing in the world’s economy.
Walton and Ragin (1990) note that all three of these variables are good predictors of austerity protests, with
the the number of restructurings being the strongest predictor.29 I also create variables for the greatest single-
28The controls employed in these regressions are consistent with those pointed out by Auvinen (1997) as ones that traditionally have
received attention in the political science, economics, and sociology literature related to political conflict. They include urbanization
rate, real per capita GDP, population, religious fractionalization, and the number of previous protests. Inflation and government debt are
not included as controls because they frequently lead to IMF involvement.
29Walton and Ragin formulate an "IMF pressure index" which is the summation of the z-scores of all 4 IMF indicators. I do not do this
for two reasons: 1) I find, like Walton and Ragin, that the number of restructurings and reschedulings is by far the best predictor; 2) the
sum of the z-scores is dominated by the restructuring variable, which is not normally distributed, and hence converting it to a z-score is
erroneous. I have analyzed the regressions reported in this paper using Walton and Ragin’s z-score variable and the results are similar -
though not as strong - as the ones reported here. These results are available upon request.
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year level of the three IMF proxies over the previous two years. These latter variables may be more suitable,
since the chain of events from IMF pressure to implementation of austerity programs to protests can take
months to matriculate and are thus often realized over multiple years.
Equation (10) does not provide a test of the model’s hypothesis; instead, it provides a test of how well the
IMF variables proxy for a "shock" in the context of the model. The model indicates that the coefficient on
the IMF "shock" variable, 1, should be positive (and statistically significant). If it is not, then the variable
in question is not a predictor of protests in general and thus should shed little light on how institutional
centralization affects the severity of protests.
A probit model is used to test equation (10). The probit coefficients are reported in Tables 4 and 5. All
regressions include continent dummies, and standard errors are clustered by continent.30
[TABLES 4 and 5 HERE]
The results in Tables 4 and 5 indicate that the "use of IMF funds" and "EFF" variables are not good
predictors of protests, but the "restructuring/rescheduling" variable is a good predictor. The coefficients
on the IMF Pressure Index are insignificant in all of the regressions where "use of IMF funds" and "EFF"
variables are employed as the shock proxy and all other controls are included. However, the number of
restructurings or reschedulings appears to be a strong predictor of protests (the coefficient is always positive
and significant), a result also found in Walton and Ragin (1990). Indeed, the terms of IMF "conditionality"
(policy prescriptions that are agreed to by all parties) are generally agreed to in return for the renegotiation
or rescheduling of debt repayment (Walton and Ragin 1990), so it is not surprising that this variable is the
"strongest" predictor of protests. Hence, for the remainder of the analysis I will only employ reschedulings -
not use of IMF funds or EFF - as a proxy for an IMF "shock".
3.2.2 Relating "Centralization" and Protest Severity
Since the rescheduling variable is a good predictor of protests, we can re-write Prediction 1 as the following:
Prediction 1A: All else being equal, a change to a more centralized economy should have a positive (negative)
effect on the probability of a more severe protest occurring when the restructuring variable is large (small)
30Including country dummies would be ideal, but there is too little variation within countries over time for this to be a feasible approach,
as all results are dependent on a small number of observations. Using non-clustered standard errors gives largely similar results, which
are available upon request.
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As in the model, Prediction 1A suggests that there is a non-linear relationship between centralization and
the severity of protests. This relationship can be estimated with the regression model in equation (11). The
dependent variable, Protest Severityit, equals one if the most severe protest in a given year and country
equals 2 or 3 and equals zero otherwise. Unfortunately, there are too few observations of protests of severity
3 to test the model using a dependent variable which equals one only if the protest is of severity 3.31 This
should not detract from the results, however, as the most significant differences in protest severity are between
those coded 1, which are generally confined and short, and 2 and 3, which are more widespread and long in
duration. As before, "CP" denotes the centralization proxy (either the constraint on the executive or political
rights variable), while the shock variable is the number of reschedulings (over one or two years).32
Protest Severityit = 0 + 1Shockit + 2CPit + 3Shockit * CPit + Xit + "it (11)
Prediction 1A implies that 2 should be negative and 3 should be positive. In other words, protest
severity should be decreasing in centralization when shocks are small (and the interaction term is small),
while protest severity should be increasing in centralization when shocks are large (and the interaction term
is large). According to the model, centralized governments should be better able to suppress small shocks, but
are subject to massive changes when there are large, systemic shocks. These predictions are mostly confirmed
in Table 6, which reports the probit coefficients of an estimation of equation (11).
[TABLE 6 HERE]
The coefficient on the centralization proxies (2) is negative in columns (2)-(4), though it is never signif-
icant, while the coefficient on the interaction term is positive in all regressions and is significant in columns
(2)-(4). A much more instructive look, however, is provided by Tables 7 and 8, which map the probability of
31Nevertheless, the results are broadly robust (in terms of statistical significance) to an ordered probit specification.
32There is the possibility that the regressions specified above suffer from an endogeneity problem. That is, it is possible that more
centralized regimes are more (or less) able to access IMF funds and impose austerity. If this is true, the "shock" variable (rescheduling)
is a function of the centralization proxy, and the regression model is misspecified. However, the correlations between the shock variables
and the centralization proxies are almost 0. Amongst the observations used in the regressions, RESC;CE =  0:0186; RESC;PR =
 0:0741, whereRESC is the rescheduling variable,CE is the "Constraint on the Executive" variable, and PR is the "Political Rights"
variable. Moreover, regressions with the rescheduling variables as the dependent variables and the centralization proxies and other
controls on the right-hand side provides highly insignificant results on the centralization proxy coefficients. These results are available
upon request.
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a severe protest occurring over varying amounts of reschedulings and values of the centralization parameter.
Again, the constraint on the executive has been transformed so that a value of 7 is the most centralized (least
constraint) and the value of 1 is the least centralized (most constraint). These probabilities were derived using
the coefficients in Table 6, taken at the average of the control variables.33
[TABLE 7 and 8 HERE]
A number of patterns emerge from these tables. First, in the lower panel of Table 7 and in both panels of
Table 8, severe protests are less likely to occur as centralization increases when there are zero reschedulings.
Although the last column suggests that this trend is not statistically significant, this is in line with what the
model predicts: centralized regimes are more able to suppress dissent when shocks are weak or non-existent.
These comparative statics reverse, however, when reschedulings occur. In all four panels of Tables 7 and 8, the
probability of severe protest is increasing in centralization when a rescheduling occurs, with the trend being
stronger when multiple reschedulings occur. This trend is statistically significant in 5 of the 8 specifications.
This result is consistent with the model: although centralized regimes are good at suppressing small shocks,
they are susceptible to massive changes when larger shocks occur. Indeed, the probability of a severe protest
occurring in the most centralized regimes is more than double that of the least centralized regimes in 5 of the
8 specifications where at least one rescheduling occurs.
In sum, this empirical exercise is meant merely to support the theoretical contribution of the model.
Although the analysis does not speak to the micro mechanisms suggested in the model, it does confirm its
testable predictions. Most importantly, it provides evidence that centralized authorities are able to suppress
changes in publicly-expressed opinion when shocks are small, but are susceptible to massive changes in
publicly-expressed opinion when shocks are large.
4 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the institutional roots of massive social, economic, and political changes. It employs
a simple economic model which suggests that authorities in centralized economies are relatively insulated
from small shocks but may be susceptible to cascades resulting in massive changes if shocks are larger. On
the micro level, this result arises because citizens living under centralized authority are more likely to choose
33The Africa dummy is set equal to 1 and all other continent dummies set equal to 0. The results are robust to setting other continent
dummies equal to 1.
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actions that differ from their intrinsic optima, as they face numerous costs from choosing such actions. This
entails that small shocks are unlikely to upset the equilibrium outcome under centralized rule, as individuals
are unwilling to incur the numerous, sometimes heavy sanctions associated with transgressing the central-
ized authority’s dictates. However, a large shock may encourage some citizens to incur these costs, which
can trigger a cascade that results in a massive change in actions of all players, including the institutional
authorities.
This hypothesis is tested using data from austerity protests in 1976-1992. I employ various measures of
IMF involvement to proxy for a "shock", as such involvement often directly led to austerity measures that
contributed to the existence and severity of the protests. A regression analysis supports the model’s hypoth-
esis, suggesting that increasing the number of debt restructurings or renegotiations undertaken by a country
leads to more severe protests in economies with centralized political authorities. Meanwhile, such protests
are less likely to occur in economies with centralized political authorities when there are zero restructurings.
The model applies to numerous historical and contemporary phenomena. The most recent example is
the Arab Spring of 2011, where citizens who had quietly lived under oppressive, centralized regimes for
decades revolted in massive numbers in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Syria, and Bahrain. Another example is the
fall of communism in the Soviet Union, which was due in part to the multi-faceted sanctions imposed by the
Communist Party - consistent with the logic spelled out in this model. Similarly, the centralization of authority
in Tsarist Russia may have led to the incredible scale of the Bolshevik Revolution (while also explaining
the central government’s ability to suppress numerous smaller outbreaks in the nineteenth century). The
interdependence between the Chinese bureaucracy and Qing rulers may help explain the scale of the Taiping
Rebellion (1850-1864), which followed after massive deflation systemically affected much of the Chinese
countryside. The model also has implications for the future of centralized regimes such as those in Iran,
China, Burma, North Korea, and Zimbabwe.34
This paper is not meant to suggest that a general framework exists for predicting revolutions or massive
social change.35 The amount of variables necessary for a revolution to occur likely renders this an impossible
task. This paper, does, however, suggest that one ubiquitous set of conditions - those associated with the
34Of course, the model also has implications for decentralized regimes, especially ones espousing separation between church and state.
Such regimes are less likely to be subject to revolutions, as decentralized authorities have more incentive to respond to the citizenry.
35Nor is this paper meant to lay out any specific prediction concerning the future of centralized economies, à la Bruce Bueno de Mesquita.
Instead, it provides a general framework which links centralized institutions to revolutionary activity.
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centralization of coercive power - are conducive to massive changes in equilibrium outcomes.
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Tables
Year
Protests
Indexed 1
Protests
Indexed 2
Protests
Indexed 3
Number of
Protests
1976 0 1 0 1
1977 0 2 1 3
1978 1 2 0 3
1979 0 1 0 1
1980 0 1 1 2
1981 1 0 1 2
1982 0 3 0 3
1983 7 5 0 12
1984 7 3 2 12
1985 6 5 0 11
1986 7 5 0 12
1987 5 2 0 7
1988 2 2 1 5
1989 8 1 3 12
1990 4 6 2 12
1991 6 2 2 10
1992 7 1 0 8
Total 61 42 13 116
Table 1: Protests and Severity by Year
Region
Protests
Indexed 1
Protests
Indexed 2
Protests
Indexed 3
Total
Protests
Africa 9 9 3 21
Asia 10 0 1 11
Central America 16 8 1 25
Europe 7 0 2 9
Middle East 2 2 5 9
South America 17 23 1 41
Total 61 42 13 116
Table 2: Protests and Severity by Continent
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Observations Mean Variance
Including All Years Used in Regressions
IMF and Centralization Variables
Use of Funds/Quota (if > 1.25) 807 0.58 1.076
Use of Funds/Quota (if > 1.25) (over 2 years) 807 1.49 1.679
Extended Fund Facility/Quota 807 0.51 1.614
Extended Fund Facility/Quota (over 2 years) 807 0.64 1.982
# of reschedulings/restructurings 807 0.37 0.289
# of reschedulings/restructurings (over 2 years) 807 0.56 0.361
Constraint on Executive (1-7) 807 3.40 4.761
Political Rights (1-7) 807 4.45 3.608
Economic and Demographic Controls
Urbanization Rate 807 0.40 0.039
Log Real GDP ($ per capita, 1987 USD) 803 2.80 0.201
Log Population 807 7.01 0.376
Religious Fractionalization 807 0.71 0.047
Table 3: Summary Statistics, IMF and Centralization Variables
**Years used in regressions are ones within one year of one of the IMF variables being positive
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Use of Funds/Quota (if > 1.25) -0.000 0.018 0.021
(0.089) (0.092) (0.091)
Extended Fund Facility/Quota 0.075*** 0.037 0.033
(0.027) (0.036) (0.037)
# of reschedulings/restructurings 0.389*** 0.304*** 0.303***
(0.099) (0.108) (0.110)
Constraint on Executive -0.020 -0.020 -0.022
(0.023) (0.023) (0.024)
Political Rights -0.041** -0.037 -0.041
(0.018) (0.024) (0.025)
Urbanization Rate 0.913 0.877 0.870 0.838 0.698 0.656
(1.153) (1.134) (1.154) (1.138) (1.025) (1.000)
Log of Real GDP -0.188 -0.193 -0.180 -0.184 -0.180 -0.183
(0.128) (0.141) (0.122) (0.137) (0.111) (0.126)
Religious Fractionalization 0.656 0.630 0.648 0.622 0.600 0.568
(0.640) (0.644) (0.670) (0.672) (0.645) (0.654)
Log of Population 0.195** 0.193** 0.190** 0.188** 0.188** 0.185**
(0.087) (0.085) (0.084) (0.082) (0.086) (0.084)
Number of Previous Protests 0.038** 0.039** 0.039** 0.040** 0.044** 0.046***
(0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.016) (0.018) (0.017)
Continent Dummies No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 805 801 801 807 803 803 807 803 803
pseudo R-squared 0.000 0.108 0.109 0.006 0.109 0.110 0.026 0.122 0.123
Table 4: Protest Presence (Probit Coefficients)
Standard errors, clustered by region, in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; A constant  term included in each regression
Dependent Variable: Protest Presence (0/1)
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
0.004 0.016 0.019
(0.090) (0.098) (0.097)
0.081*** 0.046 0.041
(0.026) (0.033) (0.033)
0.422*** 0.315*** 0.316***
(0.064) (0.074) (0.075)
Constraint on Executive -0.024 -0.025 -0.027
(0.025) (0.026) (0.027)
Political Rights -0.044** -0.040 -0.047*
(0.020) (0.026) (0.027)
Urbanization Rate 0.976 0.927 0.926 0.884 0.598 0.542
(1.103) (1.088) (1.096) (1.084) (1.046) (1.022)
Log of Real GDP -0.197 -0.199 -0.191 -0.192 -0.179* -0.179
(0.131) (0.143) (0.125) (0.139) (0.104) (0.117)
Religious Fractionalization 0.636 0.602 0.620 0.586 0.615 0.575
(0.624) (0.625) (0.651) (0.649) (0.600) (0.607)
Log of Population 0.194** 0.191** 0.186** 0.184** 0.192** 0.189**
(0.084) (0.082) (0.080) (0.079) (0.083) (0.081)
Number of Previous Protests 0.038** 0.041*** 0.038** 0.041*** 0.042** 0.045***
(0.016) (0.015) (0.017) (0.015) (0.017) (0.016)
Continent Dummies No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 788 784 784 788 784 784 788 784 784
pseudo R-squared 0.000 0.106 0.107 0.008 0.108 0.109 0.035 0.122 0.123
Dependent Variable: Protest Presence (0/1)
Standard errors, clustered by region, in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; A constant  term included in each regression
Table 5: Protest Presence, IMF variables over 2 years (Probit Coefficients)
Use of Funds/Quota (if > 1.25)
  (over 2 years)
Extended Fund Facility/Quota
  (over 2 years)
# of reschedulings/restructurings
  (over 2 years)
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
# of reschedulings 0.099 0.007
(0.148) (0.115)
Constraint on Executive 0.032 -0.033
(0.035) (0.041)
# of reschedulings*Constraint on Executive 0.024
(0.050)
Political Rights -0.023 -0.056
(0.053) (0.052)
# of reschedulings*Political Rights 0.048*
(0.027)
# of reschedulings (over 2 years) -0.246 -0.093
(0.152) (0.076)
# of reschedulings (over 2 years)*Constraint on Executive 0.085**
(0.035)
# of reschedulings (over 2 years)*Political Rights 0.061**
(0.024)
Urbanization Rate 0.959 1.013 1.032 1.065
(0.649) (0.778) (0.809) (0.857)
Log of Real GDP -0.294* -0.323* -0.312* -0.341*
(0.150) (0.168) (0.167) (0.179)
Religious Fractionalization 0.740 0.754 0.760 0.741
(0.587) (0.581) (0.543) (0.523)
Log of Population 0.183 0.195 0.191 0.198
(0.138) (0.130) (0.134) (0.127)
Number of Previous Protests 0.029 0.017 0.017 0.014
(0.032) (0.032) (0.036) (0.032)
Continent Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 705 705 690 690
pseudo R-squared 0.124 0.122 0.123 0.118
Dependent Variable:
Dummy = 1 if Protest 2 or 3
Standard errors, clustered by region, in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; A constant term included in each
regression
Table 6: Presence of Severe Protest (Probit Coefficients)
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Constr on
Exec = 1
Constr on
Exec = 2
Constr on
Exec = 3
Constr on
Exec = 4
Constr on
Exec = 5
Constr on
Exec = 6
Constr on
Exec = 7
p-value:
Ho: Column 1 =
Column 7
# of reschedulings = 0 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.026*** 0.028*** 0.030*** 0.033*** 0.035*** 0.409
[0.004] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.006] [0.009] [0.012]
# of reschedulings = 1 0.030*** 0.034*** 0.039*** 0.043*** 0.049*** 0.055*** 0.061*** 0.004
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.007] [0.008] [0.010]
# of reschedulings = 2 0.040*** 0.047*** 0.055*** 0.065*** 0.076*** 0.088** 0.101* 0.317
[0.015] [0.013] [0.014] [0.019] [0.028] [0.040] [0.055]
0.040*** 0.037*** 0.035*** 0.032*** 0.030*** 0.028*** 0.026*** 0.438
[0.012] [0.008] [0.005] [0.003] [0.003] [0.005] [0.007]
0.028*** 0.032*** 0.035*** 0.040*** 0.044*** 0.049*** 0.055*** 0.000
[0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004]
0.019*** 0.026*** 0.036*** 0.048*** 0.064*** 0.083*** 0.106*** 0.000
[0.005] [0.006] [0.006] [0.008] [0.011] [0.016] [0.023]
Pr(Protest = 2 or 3)
Standard errors, clustered by region, in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Estimates in the top 3 rows derived from Column 1 of Table 6 and estimates in the bottom 3 rows derived from Column 3 of Table 6
Table 7: Probability of Large Protest, varying shock and centralization levels
# of reschedulings = 0
  (over 2 years)
# of reschedulings = 1
  (over 2 years)
# of reschedulings = 2
  (over 2 years)
Political
Rights = 1
Political
Rights = 2
Political
Rights = 3
Political
Rights = 4
Political
Rights = 5
Political
Rights = 6
Political
Rights = 7
p-value:
Ho: Column 1 =
Column 7
# of reschedulings = 0 0.037** 0.035*** 0.034*** 0.032*** 0.030*** 0.029*** 0.027*** 0.679
[0.017] [0.012] [0.009] [0.006] [0.005] [0.007] [0.009]
# of reschedulings = 1 0.042*** 0.044*** 0.047*** 0.049*** 0.052*** 0.055*** 0.058*** 0.367
[0.015] [0.013] [0.011] [0.009] [0.008] [0.007] [0.008]
# of reschedulings = 2 0.047** 0.055*** 0.064*** 0.073*** 0.084*** 0.096*** 0.109*** 0.025
[0.019] [0.021] [0.023] [0.026] [0.030] [0.034] [0.040]
0.048** 0.042*** 0.038*** 0.033*** 0.029*** 0.026*** 0.023*** 0.327
[0.020] [0.013] [0.008] [0.005] [0.004] [0.006] [0.008]
0.045*** 0.045*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.887
[0.015] [0.012] [0.009] [0.006] [0.004] [0.004] [0.006]
0.042*** 0.048*** 0.055*** 0.062*** 0.071*** 0.080*** 0.090*** 0.021
[0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.014] [0.016] [0.020]
Pr(Protest = 2 or 3)
Standard errors, clustered by region, in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Estimates in the top 3 rows derived from Column 2 of Table 6 and estimates in the bottom 3 rows derived from Column 4 of Table 6
Table 8: Probability of Large Protest, varying shock and centralization levels
# of reschedulings = 0
  (over 2 years)
# of reschedulings = 1
  (over 2 years)
# of reschedulings = 2
  (over 2 years)
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Figures
Figure 1: Three Equilibria
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Figure 2: Stability of Equilibria
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Figure 4: Curves with different 
Figure 5: Always in the "good" equilibrium
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Figure 6: Always in the "bad" equilibrium
Figure 7: Cascades at low 
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Figure 8: Cascades at all 
Figure 9: Cascades at high 
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A Other Tables
76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 Total
Algeria X X 2
Argentina X X X X X X X X X X X X 12
Bangladesh X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 17
Benin X X X X X 5
Bolivia X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 14
Brazil X X X X X X X X X X X 11
Bulgaria X X X 3
Burkina Faso X X X 3
Cameroon X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 16
Central African Republic X X X X X X X X X X X X 12
Chad X X X 3
Chile X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 17
Congo (Dem. Rep.) X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 16
Congo (Rep.) X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 15
Costa Rica X X X X X X X X X X X X X 13
Côte d'Ivoire X X X X X X X X X X X X X 13
Dominican Republic X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 15
Ecuador X X X X X X X X X X X X 12
Egypt X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 17
El Salvador X X X X X X X X X X X 11
Ethiopia X X X X X X X X 8
Gabon X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 16
Gambia, The X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 16
Ghana X X X X X X X X X X X 11
Guatemala X X X X X 5
Guinea X X X X X X X X 8
Guinea-Bissau X X X X X 5
Guyana X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 16
Haiti X X X X X X X X X X X X 12
Honduras X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 15
Hungary X X X 3
India X X X X X X X X X X X X X 13
Iran 0
Jamaica X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 17
Jordan X X X X X 5
Table A1: IMF Pressure by Country and Year
X = IMF Pressure within one year
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76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 Total
Kenya X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 17
Korea (South) 0
Madagascar X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 14
Malawi X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 15
Mali X X X X X X X X X X X X 12
Mauritania X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 16
Mauritius X X X X X X X X X X X X 12
Mexico X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 17
Morocco X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 16
Mozambique X X X X X X X X X X 10
Nepal X X X 3
Nicaragua X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 15
Niger X X X X X X X X X X X 11
Nigeria X X X X X X X X X X X 11
Pakistan X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 17
Panama X X X X X X X X X X X X 12
Papua New Guinea X X X X X 5
Peru X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 17
Philippines X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 17
Poland X X X X X X X X X X X X X 13
Romania X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 17
Senegal X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 16
Sierra Leone X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 17
Sri Lanka X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 17
Sudan X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 17
Tanzania X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 17
Thailand X X X X X X X X X X X X X 13
Togo X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 15
Trinidad and Tobago X X X X 4
Tunisia X X X X X X X 7
Turkey X X X X X X X X X X X X X 13
Uruguay X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 17
Venezuela X X X X X X X X X X X X 12
Zambia X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 17
Zimbabwe X X X X X X X X X X X 11
19 28 35 38 44 51 55 56 56 56 56 56 60 58 59 58 52 837
X = IMF Pressure within one year
Table A1 (continued)
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Country
Protests
Indexed 1
Protests
Indexed 2
Protests
Indexed 3
Total
Protests
Algeria 0 1 1 2
Argentina 0 1 0 1
Bangladesh 1 0 0 1
Bolivia 5 2 0 7
Brazil 3 5 0 8
Bulgaria 1 0 0 1
Chile 1 3 0 4
Congo (Dem. Rep.) 1 0 1 2
Côte d'Ivoire 0 0 1 1
Dominican Republic 4 2 1 7
Ecuador 3 1 0 4
Egypt 0 0 1 1
El Salvador 2 0 0 2
Gabon 1 0 0 1
Ghana 1 0 0 1
Guatemala 0 1 0 1
Haiti 0 1 0 1
Honduras 1 0 0 1
India 6 0 0 6
Iran 1 0 0 1
Jamaica 2 2 0 4
Jordan 0 0 1 1
Mexico 4 0 0 4
Morocco 0 1 2 3
Mozambique 1 0 0 1
Nicaragua 1 0 0 1
Niger 0 1 0 1
Nigeria 0 3 0 3
Panama 2 2 0 4
Peru 3 9 0 12
Philippines 3 0 0 3
Poland 3 0 0 3
Romania 3 0 2 5
Senegal 1 0 0 1
Sierra Leone 0 1 0 1
South Korea 0 0 1 1
Sudan 2 3 0 5
Tunisia 1 0 0 1
Venezuela 2 2 1 5
Zambia 2 1 1 4
Total 61 42 13 116
Table A2: Protests And Severity by Country
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B Protest Data Description
This section describes how the protest data was collected and classified. I first identified all countries that
either satisfied at least one of the three "IMF pressure" variables noted in the text or were identified by Walton
and Seddon (1994) as having protests in this period. For all of these countries, I searched all articles in Lexis-
Nexis Academic that arose from the following search string: (IMF OR austerity) AND (riot OR protest) AND
[country]. This method produced 116 instances of protest (and 86 additional general strikes), as opposed to
146 instances found by Walton and Seddon. The difference is likely a result of coding of non-severe protests,
as I did not count events such as general strikes (unless they led to alternative forms of rioting) or small,
sector-specific strikes. However, there do not appear to be any inconsistencies in the counting of severe
protests.
As noted in Section 3.1, protests and riots were only documented if they resulted from austerity measures
or IMF pressure. In the case of protests, a specific aim of those protesting had to be some sort of austerity
measure, such as higher prices, reduced wages, or slashing of government jobs. If riots broke out, they are
only counted in the data set if they were a result of some austerity measure. Thus, a government coup would
not be part of the universe of observations, but the rioting on the streets that preceded a coup would be counted
if the rioting resulted from austerity measures..
As noted, I subjectively coded each of these protests by their severity, using the following criterion. An
instance was scored 1 if it was a small and confined (to one or two cities) protest. These protests do not
result in significant violence, and the death count is usually (but not always) zero. A protest could be scored
1 even if the government employs violence on the rioters. In this case, the metric employed is to gather all
information (available in news reports) on the riot prior to government intervention. Again, the reason that
this standard is used is that centralized governments are more likely to employ violence, and thus including
the government response in the classification could bias the results in favor of the hypothesis. This is avoided
wherever possible.
An instance was scored 2 if it were either prolonged but confined or widespread but not prolonged.
Generally, minimal deaths result in protests scored 2, but I do not rely on deaths as an indicator, since they
are often correlated with the degree of government response. Finally, instances are scored 3 if they were
prolonged and contained widespread riots. Instances scored 3 generally, but not always resulted in numerous
deaths.
The severity of some protests was not obvious. For these protests, I created an "alternate index", listed
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below. The index takes a value only when a protest can reasonably be considered of a different severity than
is given in the severity index. All protests are listed below with a brief description and severity level.
Country Month Year Description SeverityIndex
Alternate
Index?
February 1989 Student protests after gas price increase; 1000 involved in fightswith police 1 --
September 1991 30 dead; precipitated regime change 3 2
Côte d'Ivoire February 1990 Protests against wage cuts; lasted two months until austerity
dropped; relatively non-violent
3 2
Gabon December 1989 Series of strikes against austerity; national conference called 1 --
Ghana November 1978 80 strikes after austerity measures 1 --
Mozambique January 1990 Waves of strikes and protests over austerity 1  --
Niger February 1990 10 students killed, 50 wounded in protest against austerity 2 --
April 1988 6 students killed in riot over increased gas prices 2 1
May 1989 Two weeksof rioting against austerity, 30 killed 2 --
May 1992 23-100 dead in riots in many cities 2 --
Senegal March 1988 Urban riots over austerity measures 1 --
Sierra Leone July 1980 4 days of riots after gas price hike; 2 dead 2 1
March 1981 Protests in northern towns over inflation, shortages 1 --
January 1982 4 days of student protests over austerity; thousands involved, 28
deaths
2 --
March 1985 3 days of rioting following food price hikes; 5 deaths, 2000arrested 2 --
October 1987 Student protests over food and fuel price hikes, 10,000 involved,
one death
2 1
December 1987 Widespread demonstrations after price hikes 1 --
December 1986 15 dead, 1000 arrested in widespread riot over hike in price ofcornmeal; price hike rescinded 2 --
January 1989 61 arrested after change in food subsidies 1 --
July 1989 Youth food riots after food price hike 1 --
June 1990 30 dead, hundreds injured in weekend riot 3 2
Country Month Year Description SeverityIndex
Alternate
Index?
Bangladesh June 1986 Thousands protest in Dhaka over rising cost of living 1 --
February 1986 Thousands protest price hikes 1 --
September 1991 Thousands march in New Delhi to protest austerity 1 --
November 1991 Millions strike against economic policies 1 --
June 1992 Millions strike against economic policies 1 --
September 1992 Protests in New Delhi after oil price hike 1 --
November 1992 1,200 arrested, 50 injured in protest over rising prices 1 --
November 1984 8,000 protest against IMF in Manila 1 --
July 1991 Violent transport driver strike of economic policies 1 --
January 1992 Protest against rise in electricity prices 1 --
South Korea May 1980 Series of strikes and protests over austerity; 300 dead 3 2
Asia
India
Philippines
Nigeria
Sudan
Zambia
Africa
Congo (Dem.
Rep.)
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Country Month Year Description SeverityIndex
Alternate
Index?
April 1984 Protests over entire month throughout D.R. against austerity; 120dead, 6,000 arrested 3 --
July 1984 25,000 protest resumption of IMF talks 1 --
August 1984 Students protest price hikes; 1 dead 1 --
November 1984 Hundreds protest milk price hikes 1 --
January 1985 Waves of protests after price hikes; hundreds arrested 1 --
March 1988 Two weeks of protests over economic policies; 4 dead 2 1
August 1990 2 day strike over price increases; 8 dead; 1000 arrested 2 --
January 1986 8,000 protest over austerity measures 1 --
February 1986 50,000 protest over austerity measures 1 --
Guatemala September 1985 Protests over bus fare increase; 1 dead, 466 arrested 2 1
Haiti June 1984 Violence in 5 towns over 3 months over austerity; 3 dead 2 1
Honduras May 1984 20,000 protest against austerity in Tegucigalpa 1 --
January 1979 3 days of rioting over gas price increase; 7 dead 2 --
January 1985 Nationwide riots over gas price increase; 10 dead 2 --
April 1985 Protests in several towns over austerity 1 --
March 1986 Student, opposition protests over austerity 1 --
February 1983 Thousands protest in Mexico City against austerity 1 --
June 1983 Thousands of students protest against austerity 1 --
October 1983 Thousands protest in Acapulco against austerity 1 --
October 1985 7,000-10,000 marched against austerity 1 --
Nicaragua October 1990 Protests throughout Managua over austerity 1 --
November 1984 150,000 marched in protest over austerity 2 1
July 1985 Violent 2-day general strike over austerity 1 --
March 1986 Week-long strike, riot against austerity; one death 2 1
June 1991 Students, teachers riot over austerity in Panama City 1 --
Country Month Year Description SeverityIndex
Alternate
Index?
Bulgaria November 1990 20,000 protest austerity plan 1 --
January 1990 Street protests in Warsaw over austerity 1 --
April 1992 30,000 protest plans for austerity measures 1 --
May 1992 80 protests throughout country over IMF plans 1 --
November 1987 Thousands of workers riot over wage cuts 1 --
December 1987 Student and worker protests throughout country 1 --
December 1989 Hundreds dead in widespread riots 3 --
April 1991 15,000 demonstrate in Bucharest 1 --
September 1991 Miners, protesters battle police for 3 days; 3 dead 3 2
Romania
Panama
Europe
Poland
Dominican
Republic
El Salvador
Jamaica
Mexico
Central America/Caribbean
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Country Month Year Description SeverityIndex
Alternate
Index?
November 1986 3 days of student rioting in Constantine; 4 deaths; 186 jailed 2 1
October 1988 Followed increase in food prices; over a week of riots; 159 dead,
154 wounded; riots across country
3 --
Egypt January 1977 Riots throughout country over food price increase; 79 dead 3 --
Iran August 1991 Sporadic protests over bus fare increases 1 --
Jordan April 1989 Riots for a week throughout country over austerity; 8 dead 3 2
July 1981 General strike after price increases; 66 killed 3 2
January 1984 Riots in half dozen cities after food price hikes; 240 killed overfour days 3 2
December 1990 33 killed, 210 arrested in two days of riots over economic
hardships worsened by austerity
2 --
Tunisia January 1984 Riots in main towns after bread price doubled 1 --
Country Month Year Description SeverityIndex
Alternate
Index?
Argentina March 1982 6 wounded, 400 arrested in austerity protest 2 1
March 1983 Strike by public workers against austerity; 2 dead 1 --
September 1985 Month-long strike; state of siege declared; thousands arrested 2 --
January 1986 Waves of protests against austerity measures 1 --
August 1986 Widespread protests; state of siege declared 2 1
April 1987 10,000 demonstrate against austerity 1 --
November 1987 10,000 demonstrate against austerity 1 --
November 1989 Teachers strike, 700 arrested, state of siege declared 1 --
May 1983 Riots in Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro over austerity 2 1
July 1983 Workers around the country strike against austerity 2 1
September 1983 Poor riots in Rio de Janeiro; austerity behind price rise 1 --
October 1985 Thousands protest non-repayment of government debt 1 --
November 1986 Thousands riot in Brasilia against austerity; looting andvandalizing 2 1
July 1987 Violent demonstrations in Rio de Janeiro after increase in bus
fares; 100 buses set on fire; military called in
2 1
March 1989 Nationwide protest over wage freeze 1 --
March 1990 Miners rampage in Peixoto; 2 dead, many injured; protest over
austerity measures
2 --
June 1983 Labor protests and riots; 4 dead, hundreds arrested 2 1
August 1983 Riot police clash with protesters; 200 arrested 1 --
October 1983 3 days of protests; 40,000 in Santiago; more protests elsewhereover austerity; 6 dead 2 --
July 1985 Riot police break up anti-austerity protest in Santiago; 70 arrested,
3 bombs dismantled
2 1
October 1982 3 days of demonstrations against austerity; state of emergency
called
2 1
January 1985 Street protests, bus driver strike over raise in fuel prices 1 --
January 1986 Protests over prices in front of U.S. Embassy 1 --
September 1992 Protests in 3 cities over austerity; 3 explosions 1 --
July 1976 Demonstrations against tax and price increases; civil rights
suspended
2 1
June 1977 Students demonstrate against price rise in 5 cities 2 1
July 1977 Students, workers protest price hikes; 2 dead; 12 cities 2 --
May 1978 Food price riots due to austerity; 12 dead 2 --
May 1978 Youths revolt throughout Peru; 3 dead 2 --
March 1983 24-hour strike against austerity; minimal violence 1 --
September 1983 24-hour strike against austerity; 2 dead; 100 arrested 2 1
March 1984 Workers and students strike in 6 towns; 1 dead 2 1
November 1984 Student protest over austertiy in Lima; 250 arrested 1 --
September 1988 Riots against austerity; looting and windows smashed 1 --
August 1990 Week-long riots over food price hikes; 3 dead 2 --
July 1991 All-out strike national strike; 2 dead 2 1
Chile
Ecuador
Peru
Middle East/North Africa
South America
Bolivia
Brazil
Algeria
Morocco
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C Robustness Checks
In this section, I show that the results presented in the body of the paper are robust to numerous specifications.
First, it is possible that the exclusion of general strikes and localized protests from the data skews the
results. I did not include these data in the regressions analyzed in the body because they represent organized,
institutional responses to austerity, whereas the model analyzes unorganized, non-coordinated microeco-
nomic behavior. In order to make sure that the omission of general strikes and small, localized protests is
not providing misleading results, I re-analyze regression equations (10) and (11) using protest data which
includes the 86 instances of general strike and small, localized protests coded as protest severity 1. These
results are reported in Tables A3-A5.
Comparing Tables A3-A5 to Tables 4-6 indicates that there are almost no salient differences in the results
when general strikes are added. The EFF variable appears to be a good predictor of protests in Table A3
(unlike in Table 4), but this effect goes away if the variable is considered over two years. Meanwhile, the
rescheduling variable remains a good predictor of protests. The results related to protest severity (Table A5)
look nearly identical to those reported in the body (Table 6).
Next, the data employed in the body of the paper include any year within a year of some IMF pressure
being applied. However, it is possible that the correct universe of observations to employ are only years in
which protests occurred; after all, the model suggests that an absence of protests may occur for very different
reasons in centralized and decentralized countries. Moreover, it is possible that there is something inherently
different about protest and non-protest years. The main reason that all data points were used in the body is
that employing just protest years could cause a censoring bias, as it is possible that some of the years with
zero protests are censored. If international news reports did not pick up on an austerity protest, then it is not
included in the data. It is conceivable that centralized authorities are better able to suppress the reporting of
small protests, and thus it may appear that there are less small protests in centralized countries than there are
in actuality. Indeed, the estimations reported in the body over-correct for censoring issues, since they can be
interpreted as assuming that a small protest (severity 1) occurred in every year that there was IMF pressure in
a centralized country (since protests of severity 1 are lumped with non-protest years).
Yet, it is still worth estimating equation (11) restricting the universe of observations to protest years. In
this case, the dependent variable equals 1 if a protest of severity 2 or 3 occurred and equals 0 if a protest of
severity 1 occurred. The results are reported in Table A6. The results are very similar when the number of
restructurings over 2 years is considered, but not when the number of restructurings over one year is con-
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sidered. In columns 1 and 2, no coefficients are significant, and the interaction terms have the opposite sign
than is expected. This is not the case in columns 3 and 4, where the interaction term is positive and signifi-
cant, while the point estimates on the centralization proxy are negative (as expected) though insignificant. It
should be kept in mind that the censoring issue noted before might heavily bias the results reported in Table
A6 against the proposed hypothesis - and thus we should feel comfortable that the results hold in columns 3
and 4 despite this bias.
Finally, there may also be concern that the "subjective" manner in which I have labeled the protests
could lead to misleading results. In the body of the paper, I employed the "alternative index", discussed in
Appendix B, which classifies any protest as "1" which could reasonably be considered a small protest. I did
this to ensure that any protest considered "severe" was undoubtedly so. For robustness, however, it is worth
checking the results using the regular index. These results are reported in Tables A7-A9. Table A7 shows that
the probit coefficients have the same signs as in Table 6, although the interaction terms are less frequently
statistically significant. This should not be taken to indicate the insignificance of the results, however. Tables
A8 and A9 employ these coefficients to determine the probability of a severe protest occurring, as is done
in Tables 7 and 8 in the body. Tables A8 and A9 are broadly similar to Tables 7 and 8, showing similar
comparative statics and statistical significance.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Use of Funds/Quota (if > 1.25) 0.001 0.018 0.024
(0.054) (0.042) (0.044)
Extended Fund Facility/Quota 0.110*** 0.086** 0.077**
(0.034) (0.037) (0.036)
# of reschedulings/restructurings 0.442*** 0.328*** 0.326***
(0.088) (0.089) (0.093)
Constraint on Executive -0.051 -0.053 -0.053
(0.057) (0.058) (0.057)
Political Rights -0.084*** -0.077** -0.083***
(0.031) (0.035) (0.031)
Urbanization Rate 0.889 0.813 0.841 0.771 0.659 0.579
(1.335) (1.328) (1.289) (1.290) (1.189) (1.177)
Log of Real GDP -0.108 -0.113 -0.101 -0.102 -0.096 -0.098
(0.085) (0.084) (0.077) (0.079) (0.084) (0.078)
Religious Fractionalization 0.406 0.344 0.416 0.349 0.336 0.267
(0.819) (0.769) (0.853) (0.798) (0.807) (0.761)
Log of Population 0.218** 0.214** 0.207** 0.205** 0.211** 0.208**
(0.094) (0.093) (0.092) (0.091) (0.095) (0.093)
Number of Previous Protests 0.033 0.036 0.034 0.038 0.038 0.042
(0.038) (0.029) (0.042) (0.033) (0.038) (0.028)
Continent Dummies No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 805 801 801 807 803 803 807 803 803
pseudo R-squared 0.000 0.144 0.147 0.012 0.150 0.151 0.032 0.159 0.161
Table A3: Protest Presence using strike and local protest data (Probit Coefficients)
Dependent Variable: Protest Presence (0/1)
Standard errors, clustered by region, in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; A constant  term included in each regression
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
0.004 0.016 0.019
(0.090) (0.098) (0.097)
0.081*** 0.046 0.041
(0.026) (0.033) (0.033)
0.422*** 0.315*** 0.316***
(0.064) (0.074) (0.075)
Constraint on Executive -0.024 -0.025 -0.027
(0.025) (0.026) (0.027)
Political Rights -0.044** -0.040 -0.047*
(0.020) (0.026) (0.027)
Urbanization Rate 0.976 0.927 0.926 0.884 0.598 0.542
(1.103) (1.088) (1.096) (1.084) (1.046) (1.022)
Log of Real GDP -0.197 -0.199 -0.191 -0.192 -0.179* -0.179
(0.131) (0.143) (0.125) (0.139) (0.104) (0.117)
Religious Fractionalization 0.636 0.602 0.620 0.586 0.615 0.575
(0.624) (0.625) (0.651) (0.649) (0.600) (0.607)
Log of Population 0.194** 0.191** 0.186** 0.184** 0.192** 0.189**
(0.084) (0.082) (0.080) (0.079) (0.083) (0.081)
Number of Previous Protests 0.038** 0.041*** 0.038** 0.041*** 0.042** 0.045***
(0.016) (0.015) (0.017) (0.015) (0.017) (0.016)
Continent Dummies No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 788 784 784 788 784 784 788 784 784
pseudo R-squared 0.000 0.106 0.107 0.008 0.108 0.109 0.035 0.122 0.123
Table A4: Protest Presence using strike and local protest data, IMF variables over 2 years (Probit Coefficients)
Dependent Variable: Protest Presence (0/1)
Use of Funds/Quota (if > 1.25)
  (over 2 years)
Extended Fund Facility/Quota
  (over 2 years)
# of reschedulings/restructurings
  (over 2 years)
Standard errors, clustered by region, in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; A constant  term included in each regression
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
# of reschedulings 0.062 -0.044
(0.116) (0.148)
Constraint on Executive 0.020 -0.033
(0.036) (0.037)
# of reschedulings*Constraint on Executive 0.030
(0.048)
Political Rights -0.035 -0.065
(0.049) (0.053)
# of reschedulings*Political Rights 0.058**
(0.029)
# of reschedulings (over 2 years) -0.215*** -0.123
(0.082) (0.162)
# of reschedulings (over 2 years)*Constraint on Executive 0.076***
(0.027)
# of reschedulings (over 2 years)*Political Rights 0.064*
(0.033)
Urbanization Rate 1.286** 1.317** 1.373** 1.392**
(0.529) (0.645) (0.645) (0.700)
Log of Real GDP -0.339*** -0.366*** -0.358*** -0.386***
(0.118) (0.134) (0.135) (0.144)
Religious Fractionalization 0.803 0.808 0.819 0.796
(0.604) (0.599) (0.556) (0.540)
Log of Population 0.179 0.191 0.187 0.194
(0.149) (0.140) (0.146) (0.136)
Number of Previous Protests 0.038 0.028 0.028 0.025
(0.039) (0.034) (0.040) (0.033)
Continent Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 705 705 690 690
pseudo R-squared 0.132 0.132 0.131 0.128
Table A5: Presence of Severe Protest using strike and local protest data (Probit Coefficients)
Dependent Variable:
Dummy = 1 if Protest 2 or 3
Standard errors, clustered by region, in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; A constant term included in each
regression
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
# of reschedulings 0.043 0.036
(0.368) (0.447)
Constraint on Executive 0.208 -0.013
(0.175) (0.178)
# of reschedulings*Constraint on Executive -0.028
(0.114)
Political Rights 0.188 -0.044
(0.191) (0.228)
# of reschedulings*Political Rights -0.030
(0.080)
# of reschedulings (over 2 years) -1.126** -0.977**
(0.446) (0.448)
# of reschedulings (over 2 years)*Constraint on Executive 0.237**
(0.108)
# of reschedulings (over 2 years)*Political Rights 0.222*
(0.125)
Urbanization Rate 0.975 1.597 0.816 1.434
(1.960) (2.338) (2.272) (2.529)
Log of Real GDP -0.418 -0.420 -0.429 -0.413
(0.361) (0.371) (0.375) (0.385)
Religious Fractionalization 0.731 1.087 0.775 0.968
(1.081) (0.848) (1.177) (0.931)
Log of Population 0.041 0.101 0.043 0.128
(0.157) (0.123) (0.158) (0.130)
Number of Previous Protests 0.036 0.003 -0.013 -0.029
(0.027) (0.042) (0.023) (0.042)
Continent Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 104 104 103 103
pseudo R-squared 0.104 0.080 0.132 0.094
Table A6: Presence of Severe Protest, only protest years (Probit Coefficients)
Dependent Variable:
Dummy = 1 if Protest 2 or 3
Standard errors, clustered by region, in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; A constant term included in each
regression
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
# of reschedulings -0.105 -0.130
(0.315) (0.101)
Constraint on Executive -0.011 0.004
(0.034) (0.039)
# of reschedulings*Constraint on Executive 0.073
(0.064)
Political Rights -0.085*** -0.052
(0.031) (0.049)
# of reschedulings*Political Rights 0.088***
(0.025)
# of reschedulings (over 2 years) -0.135 -0.060
(0.272) (0.046)
# of reschedulings (over 2 years)*Constraint on Executive 0.041
(0.046)
# of reschedulings (over 2 years)*Political Rights 0.029
(0.032)
Urbanization Rate 1.249*** 1.309** 1.412*** 1.496***
(0.396) (0.540) (0.411) (0.515)
Log of Real GDP -0.403** -0.458*** -0.417** -0.475***
(0.161) (0.162) (0.166) (0.165)
Religious Fractionalization 1.130*** 1.127*** 1.182*** 1.208***
(0.418) (0.393) (0.438) (0.428)
Log of Population 0.214 0.231* 0.223* 0.235*
(0.134) (0.129) (0.131) (0.129)
Number of Previous Protests 0.004 -0.007 -0.005 -0.014
(0.047) (0.044) (0.049) (0.042)
Continent Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 705 705 690 690
pseudo R-squared 0.136 0.137 0.126 0.124
Table A7: Presence of Severe Protest, other index (Probit Coefficients)
Dependent Variable:
Dummy = 1 if Protest 2 or 3
Standard errors, clustered by region, in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; A constant term included in each
regression
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Constr on
Exec = 1
Constr on
Exec = 2
Constr on
Exec = 3
Constr on
Exec = 4
Constr on
Exec = 5
Constr on
Exec = 6
Constr on
Exec = 7
p-value:
Ho: Column 1 =
Column 7
# of reschedulings = 0 0.024*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.020*** 0.743
[0.006] [0.004] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.004] [0.006]
# of reschedulings = 1 0.022** 0.026*** 0.029*** 0.034*** 0.039*** 0.044*** 0.050** 0.273
[0.011] [0.009] [0.008] [0.008] [0.010] [0.014] [0.020]
# of reschedulings = 2 0.020 0.028 0.038* 0.051** 0.066** 0.085** 0.108 0.263
[0.022] [0.023] [0.022] [0.023] [0.029] [0.043] [0.067]
0.026*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.917
[0.009] [0.007] [0.005] [0.004] [0.003] [0.004] [0.006]
0.021** 0.023*** 0.026*** 0.029*** 0.032*** 0.035*** 0.039*** 0.305
[0.008] [0.007] [0.006] [0.006] [0.007] [0.010] [0.013]
0.017 0.020 0.025* 0.031** 0.037** 0.045** 0.054* 0.285
[0.015] [0.015] [0.014] [0.014] [0.016] [0.021] [0.029]
Table A8: Probability of Large Protest, varying shock and centralization levels, other index
Pr(Protest = 2 or 3)
# of reschedulings = 0
  (over 2 years)
# of reschedulings = 1
  (over 2 years)
# of reschedulings = 2
  (over 2 years)
Standard errors, clustered by region, in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Estimates in the top 3 rows derived from Column 1 of Table 6 and estimates in the bottom 3 rows derived from Column 3 of Table 6
Political
Rights = 1
Political
Rights = 2
Political
Rights = 3
Political
Rights = 4
Political
Rights = 5
Political
Rights = 6
Political
Rights = 7
p-value:
Ho: Column 1 =
Column 7
# of reschedulings = 0 0.044*** 0.037*** 0.030*** 0.025*** 0.020*** 0.017*** 0.013*** 0.016
[0.011] [0.008] [0.006] [0.005] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
# of reschedulings = 1 0.040** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.917
[0.016] [0.014] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.014] [0.015]
# of reschedulings = 2 0.037* 0.045* 0.054** 0.065** 0.078** 0.092** 0.108** 0.136
[0.021] [0.023] [0.026] [0.030] [0.035] [0.043] [0.053]
0.043** 0.038*** 0.034*** 0.030*** 0.027*** 0.024*** 0.021*** 0.332
[0.018] [0.012] [0.008] [0.005] [0.004] [0.005] [0.006]
0.040** 0.038*** 0.036*** 0.035*** 0.033*** 0.031*** 0.030*** 0.563
[0.016] [0.014] [0.011] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.011]
0.038** 0.038** 0.039** 0.039** 0.040* 0.04 0.041 0.908
[0.015] [0.015] [0.016] [0.019] [0.021] [0.025] [0.029]
Table A9: Probability of Large Protest, varying shock and centralization levels, other index
Pr(Protest = 2 or 3)
# of reschedulings = 0
  (over 2 years)
# of reschedulings = 1
  (over 2 years)
# of reschedulings = 2
  (over 2 years)
Standard errors, clustered by region, in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Estimates in the top 3 rows derived from Column 2 of Table 6 and estimates in the bottom 3 rows derived from Column 4 of Table 6
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D Proofs
D.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. At  = 0, the vertical intercept of the curve is 12m1

m1  m2 +m3
 
1  bN+m4. This can
be seen by plugging in F (b) = 0 into equation (8). Meanwhile, the value of the curve at  is always
1
2m1

m1 +m3
 
1  bN+m4 (this can be seen by plugging in F (b) = 0:5 into equation (8)). Hence,
when   12m1

m1  m2 +m3
 
1  bN+m4, the curve is above the 45-degree line at the inflection
point at . Moreover, the curve does not reach the 45-degree line at values smaller than the inflection point
at , since  equals the vertical intercept and the curve in increasing. Hence, cascades do not emerge and the
only equilibrium is the "good" equilibrium. If this is the case at  = 0, it must be the case for all .
On the other hand, at  ! 1, the largest value of the curve is 12m1 [m1 +m2 +m3 +m4]. This can be
seen by plugging in F (b) = 1 into equation (9). If  > 12m1 [m1 +m2 +m3 +m4], then the curve must
be under the 45-degree line at , since the value of the curve at  is always 12m1

m1 +m3
 
1  bN+m4.
It must remain under the 45-degree line for all values beyond , as well, since the highest point on the curve
equals 12m1 [m1 +m2 +m3 +m4], which is less than all values greater than . Hence, cascades do not
emerge, and the only equilibrium is the "bad" equilibrium. If this is the case at  = 1, it must be the case
for all .
D.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. I first find the condition under which the inflection point is above the 45-degree line at  = 0 (which
means that it is above the 45-degree line for all ). From (8), it is clear (subbing F (b) = 0:5 at b = )
that the curve is above the 45-degree line at  = 0 only when  < 12m1
 
m1 +m3
 
1  bN+m4. From
Proposition 1 we know cascades never occur when   12m1

m1  m2 +m3
 
1  bN+m4, so here we
are concerned with  2 12m1
 
m1  m2 +m3
 
1  bN+m4;m1 +m3  1  bN+m4. As  ! 1, the
curve is nearly a straight line connecting the vertical axis to the inflection point, meaning that it remains above
the 45-degree line. This means that the curve only crosses the 45-degree line once, at the "good" equilibrium.
This remains the case for sufficiently large , though at some smaller , the curve at  = 0 must cross
the 45-degree line (since the curve up to the inflection point is nearly horizontal as  ! 0). Since the curve
merely shifts upwards for higher , it must also be true that the curve crosses the 45-degree line when  is
small (say,   ) but not when it is larger when  < . Hence, cascades can emerge when  < 
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and   , since the curve intersects the 45-degree line three times, but not when  > . If m2 > m3bN ,
meaning that it is possible for the curve to intersect the 45-degree line at  !1 at some point in this range,
there must also exist  <  where cascades can emerge at all  when  < . This can easily be seen by
taking the case where  ! 0:
D.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Consider the case where the inflection point is always beneath the 45-degree line. If this is true at  !
1, it will be true for all . From (9), it is clear that this will be the case when  > 12m1 (m1 +m3 +m4).
From Proposition 1, we know that cascades never emerge when  > 12m1 [m1 +m2 +m3 +m4], so we
focus here on  2 12m1 (m1 +m3 +m4;m1 +m2 +m3 +m4]. As  ! 1, the curve will only cross the
45-degree line once at the bad equilibrium. At lower levels of , the curve crosses the 45-degree line three
times only for sufficiently large  ( ), but not at lower levels of  (remember, increasing  merely entails
a shift downward in the curve). As  ! 0, it must be the case that the curve crosses the 45-degree line three
times for all values of . Finally, I argue that in cases ii) and iii), as  increases, C is more insulated from
small shocks, but is more susceptible to large protests relative to the pre-shock state after large shocks. This
can easily be seen in Figures 9 and 8. For ranges over which a cascade can occur, the threshold bliss point is
closer to the pre-shock equilibrium when  is smaller, meaning that when  is large, C is more insulated from
cascades. However, it is also the case that when  is large, the pre-shock equilibrium is one with less protest
(more citizens choose aj = 0). Since the inflection point is beneath the 45-degree line, the line must be flatter
at the "bad" equilibrium than it is at the "good" equilibrium (since the curve is symmetric). Hence, when the
shock is large enough that a cascade emerges, the change in equilibrium protest is greater in percentage terms
when  is larger.
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E Appendix: Extra Proposition
Proposition 4 If  2 12m1
 
m1 +m3
 
1  bN+m4;m1 +m3 +m4, then 9  , , and , where
 <  and  <  such that:
i) Cascades only emerge at  2 (; ) (for some values  and ); all economies with
 <  are in a "bad" equilibrium and all economies with  >  are in a "good" equilibrium if
  
iia) Cascades can only emerge at    (for some value ) and all economies with  >  are in a
"good" equilibrium if  2 [; )
OR
iib) Cascades can only emerge at    (for some value ) and all economies with  <  are in a
"bad" equilibrium if  2 [; )
iii) Cascades can emerge for all  if  <  (if iia) or  <  (if iib)
Proof. Consider the case where the inflection point is above the 45-degree line at  ! 1 but below the 45-
degree line at  ! 0. From (8) and (9), it is clear that this occurs when  > 12m1
 
m1 +m3
 
1  bN+m4
and   12m1 (m1 +m3 +m4). At sufficiently large , it must be the case that the curve only crosses the
45-degree line once at both  !1 and  = 0, but must cross three times for some intermediate values of .
At lower , it must either be the case that the curve crosses the 45-degree line at  !1 but not  = 0 or at
 = 0 but not  !1. This can be visualized by noting that the slope of the curve around the inflection point
is increasing as  gets smaller, meaning that the curve has to eventually cross the 45-degree line for a second
time for either  !1 or  = 0 at sufficiently small . Finally, at very small , the curve is steep enough at
the inflection point where it must cross the 45-degree line for all values of .
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